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News from African Protected Areas

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Professional training on PA management: the 6th session of the University Diploma has started in Ouagadougou

Direction 4 of the Road Map for African PAs

Law enforcement monitoring in protected areas: necessary for conservation, but inadequate for good governance

Directions 1 to 6 of the Road Map for African PAs



Twenty students, coming from ten different countries (Cap-Vert, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin, Niger), have gathered in Ouaga, on the 8th of April, to launch the 6th edition of the PA management training course, organized by IUCN and the University Senghor of Alexandria, in Egypt. Targeting young professionals working in and around PAs (PA managers, NGOs, private sector...), this training associates theory and practice on the ground and lasts 8 weeks. Next possible edition in October, in Central Africa...



By **Romain Calaque**, Central Africa Regional coordinator for Policy and Programme Support - WCS Afrique & Europe (Yaoundé, Cameroun)

Introduction

Most conservationists agree that the loss of natural habitats (through degradation or conversion, particularly in forest zones) and illegal hunting (for meat or trophies) are the two main direct threats to wildlife.

In the Congo Basin, for example, issues of governance in general and forest governance in particular also rank high among indirect threats to wildlife. Regarding the four main pillars of governance, namely accountability, plurality, subsidiarity and transparency, the forestry and environment sector as a whole is often characterized by impunity, collusion, centralism and opacity¹; protected areas in some Congo Basin countries are no exception.

On the other hand, many cases in Africa and elsewhere have demonstrated that the enforcement


¹ See, for example, Paolo Omar Cerutti, Luca Tacconi, Guillaume Lescuyer & Robert Nasi (...): "La face cachée de l'exploitation du bois au Cameroun: sciage artisanal, corruption et niveau de vie des populations", Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal.

of wildlife laws in protected areas help to preserve habitats and species². One of the burning issues in the governance of protected areas is the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of wildlife laws. This issue is often addressed, from a technical viewpoint, by listing, quantifying and qualifying the human, logistic and financial resources needed to implement such laws on the one hand, and by proposing strategies and methods to mobilize resources on the other. In the first case, the specific issue of *monitoring and evaluating* the enforcement of laws (LEM) constitutes a step in a classical feedback loop for adapting and improving law enforcement: it is, in itself, a major step in the monitoring and evaluation process, which technically, justifies its implementation.

However, technical limitations are seldom used to explain the non-mobilization of resources and methods to enforce laws in protected areas: most often, key stakeholders, although not always in the majority, have vested interests that diverge from

those of safeguarding protected areas. Consequently, these stakeholders block and/or divert resources mobilized. Thus, the non-enforcement of laws is as much, if not more, a governance issue than merely a technical one. In the second case, law enforcement monitoring is *also* of growing importance to stakeholders concerned (national authorities, civil society, donors, etc.), who are *willing*³ to tackle the scourge of poor governance of protected areas. In fact, it can be hypothesized that law enforcement monitoring (LEM) not only improves management, but also helps to make the sector more transparent. LEM can also help to combat collusion, hence the impunity of poachers and traffickers.

This paper seeks to explore, beyond the technical protocol itself, the conditions that enable LEM to significantly contribute to improving the governance of protected areas.



² Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland 1993; Miquelle & Smirnov 1999; Bruner et al. 2001; Hilborn et al. 2006; Byers & Noonburg 2007; Dobson & Lynes 2008; etc.

³ Actors that can subsequently be qualified as "motivated", implied by the protection of protected areas, whatever the reasons, as opposed to stakeholders who temporarily or structurally have interests opposed to the effective protection of protected areas.

The law enforcement process in protected areas (see graph on precedent page)

Law enforcement monitoring (LEM) clearly presupposes the existence of a concrete wildlife law enforcement process that can be described in terms of a more conceptual framework at the central level, and a more prosaic framework at the local level: (1) public will to promote wildlife protection is reflected in a "sector policy"; (2) that guides the adoption and amendment of laws and regulations; (3) whose enforcement is incumbent on a number of public services; (4) which should define a medium- and long-term strategy (objectives and outcomes); (5) broken down into short- and medium-term methods (technical and financial procedures); (6) reflected in field actions implemented using human, financial and logistical resources; (7) resulting in the arrest of offenders; (8) who are prosecuted in accordance with the laws and regulations in force.

This process is part of an adaptive management loop when the evaluation of all these stages brings about change in public will, which itself leads to changes in laws and regulations made by representatives of public authorities, etc. Furthermore, an existing appraisal mechanism anchored in a monitoring mechanism should be set up. It is worth noting that, as in any adaptive process, the proper *enforcement* of "appropriate" laws requires sound *monitoring and evaluation* (LEM).

Proper monitoring: the case of MIST

LEM should cover the entire cycle described above. In fact, when it exists, LEM should mainly monitor field patrols and sometimes focus on legal proceedings. That is the case with the MIST⁴ software protocol which helps to monitor the efforts and outcomes of roving patrols to check illegal activities in protected areas (in terms of indices, occurrence reports or arrests).

This Management Information System (MIST) software was developed by GTZ and ESS specifically for use in protected areas in Uganda (UWA) between 1997 and 2002. The free software⁵ was subsequently used successfully in Asia to monitor patrols in (about thirty) networks of protected areas, or in tiger conservation priority sites.

In recent years, MIST has also been used in protected areas in Central Africa (particularly DRC and Gabon) in particular to monitor the efforts and outcomes of actions to combat poaching, whether

such patrols are conducted on foot, by car, on dams or even by air.

In its next version, known as SMART⁶, this computerized protocol will also help to strengthen methods upstream and monitor legal proceedings downstream.

Experience has shown that MIST can be used in various contexts: not only in protected areas, but also in forest concessions, tourist sites, hunting grounds and fishing zones.

The process described above implies that MIST can be used in different sector policy contexts (forestry, conservation, fisheries, etc.), regulations (codes, laws, decrees), administrative organization charts (ministries or agencies), (big or small) private or (formal or informal) community actors and available resources on the ground (levels of decentralization, forest/savannah, differences, etc.). It also implies that although the heart (method, software, etc.) of the MIST protocol is the same, its technical and financial implementation on the ground varies according to various contexts, requiring more or fewer foot, roving, nautical, air, etc. patrols.

Specifically, the functioning of MIST at the local level first of all presupposes two initial stages, namely the establishment of the standard database (DB) shared by all relevant sites and the training of all relevant users (data collectors, DB managers and policy makers). Then, MIST is implemented in five stages, according to what might be called a patrol cycle: collection of data on the current patrol cycle, data input and clean up, mapping and statistical reporting, dissemination within a 360° radius, analysis and lastly, well-reasoned decisions regarding the next patrol cycle.




Photo Conservation Justice (Luc Mathot)

⁴Ecological Software Solutions LLC 2009.

⁵<http://www.ecostats.com/software/mist/mist.htm>.

⁶<http://smartconservationsoftware.org/L>



Benefits of LEM as a MIST for field actors

There is a cost to monitoring wildlife law enforcement. Consequently, it must offer clear *benefits* to the decision-makers who approve its implementation. There are at least three potential benefits of LEM (for example, MIST) on the ground:

- **Improving the *efficacy* of patrols:** by quantifying the efforts and results of patrols carried out to combat poaching, LEM distinguishes between the positive results of *motivated* guards whose status is enhanced among their hierarchy, whether they are *motivated* senior officials on the ground (in protected areas) or at the central level (in capitals); in addition, LEM can exert pressure on *unmotivated* guards whose performance is poor; furthermore, training in LEM will help to build the capacity of motivated guards and contribute to enhancing their motivation and careers.
- **Improving the *efficiency* of patrols:** by comparing result/effort ratios ("catch per unit of effort" - CPUE) between various sites for a given period, LEM indicates zones with high risks to *motivated* decision-makers (high CPUE) and/or less risks or poorly monitored zones (low CPUE), enabling them to more efficiently allocate (human, financial, logistical) resources. This is the same when different patrol methods are compared: through LEM, the efficiency of foot patrols can be compared with roving patrols, that of nautical patrols with air patrols, etc.
- **Improving *advocacy*:** by quantifying CPUE using several territories throughout the year, LEM provides strong arguments using the success

stories of protected areas for *motivated* decision-makers to defend their annual investment and recurrent budgets. For their part, policy makers can use this advocacy as effective instruments in ministries or technical supervisory bodies such as financial supervisory ministries (for example, during annual budgetary conferences). LEM provides private decision-makers like logging companies (that operate on the peripheries of protected areas) good arguments for defending budgets of wildlife management plans in Board meetings. Overall, monitoring enhances advocacy among international donors.

Benefits of LEM as a MIST for the Governance of Protected Areas

The foregoing analysis shows that poor governance as a whole and poor governance in sectors related to wildlife conservation in particular (protected areas, hunting grounds, forest, fishing and ecotourism sites, etc.) is widely perceived as the main underlying cause of poaching. Moreover, this issue is at the heart of the "Roadmap for African Protected Areas" developed by IUCN and the WCPA.

To date, the concept of governance does not have an internationally accepted definition. However, many definitions have been proposed, for example: "*Governance refers to the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society*" (European Commission, 2008). In our case, the relevance of the "governance of protected areas" can be understood since the whole issue revolves around knowing how to "reorganize" the various "interests" currently involved in illegal activities carried out in protected areas (whether for meat, trophies, wood, minerals, etc.), usually backed by powerful local or national "authorities", motivated by the huge "resources generated" through these activities such that they respect the "regulations" necessary for life in society.

It is almost unanimously assumed that there are at least three guiding principles of "good governance" (including the good governance of protected areas). These are participation (and/or inclusion versus exclusion), transparency (versus opacity) and responsibility (versus impunity). Regarding wildlife areas, the monitoring of the enforcement of sectoral laws significantly contributes to compliance with these three principles, beginning with a strong contribution to the transparency of the sector.

In fact, law enforcement monitoring promotes **transparency** in protected areas. Thus, the very *existence* of maps and statistics produced using the

MIST protocol is a major achievement in sectors (protected areas, forestry, etc.) where quantified and geo-referenced information on poaching (and other illegal activities) has generally been lacking for a very long time. When MIST is implemented, some decision-makers can no longer pretend that they are "unaware" of such illegal activities; at best, all they can say is that they do not have "enough" information to act. Thus, although the distribution of MIST reports is often limited (see below), it remains a major improvement in transparency.

When a decision-maker using MIST ascertains quantitatively and through mapping that there is an issue of non-compliance with the laws in force, it is very difficult for him/her (though unfortunately not impossible) not to do anything to address the situation. Furthermore, the preparation of a MIST report means that many links in the decision-making chain know that the senior decision-maker is aware and is therefore obliged to take a decision. Thus, MIST contributes to strengthening the **responsibility** of decision-makers.

includes the influence of conservation projects financed by international donors that often resort to management by non-State bodies (consulting firms, NGOs, etc.). It should be noted that although this process is not law enforcement, State and non-State actors (national and international NGOs) are increasingly using LEM, through MIST, thus contributing not only to enhancing transparency, but also the accountability of public employees and, ultimately, the direct or indirect **participation** of civil society in decision-making processes.



Poaching of elephants in Gabon – the two poachers have been released after payment of a fine – the arm they used belonged to the “Sous-Préfet” (photo Romain Calaque)

Lastly, the effective implementation of LEM such as MIST contributes to ensuring compliance with the principle of good political governance in States with multiple decision-making levels. This is the principle of **subsidiarity**, according to which a decision (hence a responsibility) concerning the resolution of an issue must be taken by the competent public authority that is closest to the ground. In other words, decisions should not be executed at a higher level (= far from the ground) when they can effectively be taken at a lower level (= closer to the ground); bodies placed at a higher level should intervene only if the body at the lower level does not have the capacity to resolve the problem faced. In the case of protected areas, offences other than those related to the trafficking of trophies (particularly ivory) are usually identified at the local level. Accordingly, decisions related to such offences should be initiated at the local level. However, actors on the ground who certainly have weak reporting capacity are often prevented from taking decisions concerning the monitoring of infringements in favour of decision-makers located far away, often in the national capital. By building the reporting capacity of local actors,



Weapons collected in Gabon (plateaux Batékés) – this kind of automatic arm is in particular used for poaching of elephants (photo Paul Aczel)

In countries whose political and administrative culture is subject to French influence, wildlife policing (the fight against poaching, etc.) is often considered as a public policy issue and falls within the prerogatives of the State given that law enforcement and monitoring are *a priori* the responsibility of public authorities. However, in areas allocated to the private sector (tourist, forestry, hunting sites, etc.), this function is often shared with private operators. This is even more true in African countries (East and Southern Africa) whose political and administrative culture is subject to influences other than French. If

MIST also strengthens their legitimacy to handle infringements locally and probably more effectively in some protected areas.

Technical condition for success: an "appropriate technology"

To produce benefits on the ground in terms of management and governance, an LEM process such as MIST should comply with technical, financial and governance conditions. We will start by examining the technical and financial conditions for the success of LEM.

Before expecting benefits on the ground, the LEM decision-maker should mobilize financial, material and human resources for LEM implementation. In the present context of Africa, these resources are generally lacking compared to other parts of the world (Asia, Latin America, etc.). Consequently, when a project financed by a donor can *temporarily* permit them to do so, decision-makers should not "copy" and "paste" methods that have been successful elsewhere, that require them to mobilize resources that are incompatible with local African realities. In concrete terms, an LEM should be adapted to local realities, which is the quality of an "appropriate technology"⁷ like MIST.

First, the protocol should have practical objectives. Although MIST does not provide answers to all possible questions raised by an LEM, at least it provides few, but accurate, answers.

Next, the technological deficiencies of the protocol are assets in a given local context. Although the MIST software is not sophisticated, it is suitable for use by guards and team leaders with computer skills. Its robustness is adapted to equipment found on the ground and its implementation cost (free software, installation time and short-term training, low maintenance, etc.) make it suitable for the resource base at the end of the chain in protected areas.

Lastly, MIST is a core software that is being fine-tuned to switch it to SMART, but concerns only the most critical inadequacies of existing protocols. For example, SMART should help to interconnect local databases (DB) in order to computerize the integration of actions at the local level with those at the national or to enable the posting of complex Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

Other improvements are necessary (integration of "real time" technologies via mobile telephony, convergence with "online" solutions inspired from Google tools, etc.). However, in view of latest developments in computers and electronics, especially in the manner of use (first, available technical expertise available on the ground), these innovations are still being tested and may be integrated into the daily activities of guards in protected areas only in the future. SMART will therefore be more robust, but only insofar as it remains an "appropriate technology" that matches the needs and capacity of field workers.



Gorilla poached and sold at the market of mont Bouët in Libreville (photo Aurélie Zissman)

Underlying condition for success: report by a "motivated" decision-maker

Assuming that the technical and financial conditions mentioned above help to deploy MIST and hence produce monitoring-related benefits, decision-makers should implement MIST. A case in point is Gabon where MIST was implemented at the end of a process that should be described and analyzed, as it is an exception rather than a rule.

On the eve of the 2002 Johannesburg EarthSummit, the President of Gabon issued a decision establishing 13 national parks covering about 11% of the national territory on the conviction that huge diplomatic and economic benefits could be derived from it. The landmark initial overhaul of the sector of protected areas in Gabon has, to some extent, induced national park management bodies (the National Council and the National Agency) to be open to innovations.

The will at the highest political level was based partly on arguments presented by NGOs⁸ (WCS, WWF)

⁷ See "Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered" by Dr. Ernst Friedrich "Fritz" Schumacher and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriate_technology.

and/or Western (American and European) programmes which possibly explains why, despite tensions induced by this support from the Presidency, park officials received and partially adopted various strategic, legal, technical or organizational recommendations made by non-State actors. Within this context, the Executive Secretariat of the National Agency of National Parks (ANPN) of Gabon adopted the proposal made by an NGO (WCS) to conduct a MIST test in two national parks (Lope and Loango) in 2008.

The next step in the reporting process was mainly carried out on the ground. Various training courses organized for field staff, the growing application of the monitoring protocol by field staff, the extension of tests to other national parks with the support of other NGOs (WWF), the steady increase in international financing for the conduct of such tests, growing interest of other donors and the distribution of more comprehensive and frequent MIST reports resulted in the building of a fairly strong legitimacy of MIST as a standard tool for the management of national parks in Gabon from the lowest level to the highest (from staff to park managers and then national policymakers) in a very adaptive (some sites complete the test while others begin) and participatory (role of NGOs) manner.

The penultimate stage of the adoption of MIST, i.e. its extension to all Gabonese national parks, was reached during the second overhaul of the sector of protected areas in Gabon. Following in his father's footsteps and encouraged by the same people (particularly Dr. Mike Fay and Dr. Lee JT White), the President of Gabon who was elected in 2009, made national parks a showcase for his country's emergence programme (one of whose three pillars is called "Green Gabon⁸"). This new political impetus has encouraged the introduction of innovations, even from non-State bodies. Thus, after his appointment and direct attachment to the Presidency by the President of the Republic, the new head of Gabon's national parks, Dr. Lee JT White⁹, among other things, adopted MIST in 2010 as the standard instrument for monitoring patrols in the 13 national parks of Gabon, in partnership with concerned conservation NGOs.

Only one step in LEM in Gabonese national parks remains to be completed. This is the

institutionalization of LEM in the governance of such parks. In fact, although the ANPN adopted MIST to monitor *all* the country's national parks, this has not been formalized. Though field protocols (procedures, databases, etc.), training of staff, role of technical assistants from NGOs or end-use of reports on the ground are clear, they have not yet been included in official instruments. For example, since the ANPN has not formally validated the 2011 national MIST synthesis compiled by WCS for all Gabonese national parks, it has not been published. Although the benefits of MIST for parks on the ground (efficacy, efficiency and advocacy) are incontestable, benefits in terms of improvement of wildlife governance (transparency, participation, accountability) are significant, but still incomplete. It seems that at present, the process has reached the limits of "motivation".



Photo Conservation justice (Luc Mathot)

Perhaps this last step will be completed by the ANPN, in conjunction with the Gabonese Ministry of Water and Forests. In fact, the second thrust is also actively involved in testing MIST for LEM in forest concessions in three of the nine provinces of Gabon, with technical assistance from WCS and WWF and significant involvement of some major logging companies. Conserved and logged forests could therefore be monitored by homogeneous patrols, allowing for very enlightening comparisons and paving the way for enhanced sectoral governance in

⁸ Visit the website of the Presidency of the Republic: <http://www.gabon-vert.com/>

⁹ Renowned British biologist naturalized as a Gabonese citizen, precisely from the head office of one of these conservation NGOs (WCS-Gabon).

vast areas, including protected areas and forest concessions.

Beyond LEM: integration into a complete toolkit for the good governance of protected areas

First, from the technical standpoint, LEMs such as MIST cover only part of law enforcement in national parks:

- MIST is currently used to monitor activities to combat poaching for game through field patrols. However, MIST is not widely used (and it is unsuitable?) for monitoring actions to fight the poaching for trophies (particularly ivory), which is based on surveys and intelligence.
- MIST targets only part of the law enforcement process (mainly field actions, more or less characterized by the circulation of reports), and does not (or not yet¹⁰) follow strategic steps upstream (and much less, steps in the amendment of legal instruments) and legal steps downstream, much less in monitoring the adequacy of laws and regulations in protected areas and their peripheries at the national level.

Next, a LEM tool helps to overcome only a few technical deficiencies relating to the monitoring or enforcement process itself. It is not suitable for the fight against poor governance.

In other words, MIST strengthens officials whose interests converge with those of good governance (see above). However, it does not sufficiently fight against (private or public) officials whose interests are at variance with those of good governance: those who have an interest in maintaining opacity, exclusion and impunity, to maintain power based on collusion and/or incomes based on corruption. That is why MIST is a necessary tool (especially for honest officials), but an inadequate tool (particularly against corrupt officials). It should be included in a "toolkit" for wildlife governance, comprising tools totally devoted to the fight against poor governance¹¹. Examples include:

- Partnerships between Government and "specialized" NGOs on the full implementation of wildlife laws, including "investigations, operations, legal follow-up and mediatization," based on the model of LAGA (Cameroon), PALF (Congo) or AAlf (Gabon);

- Legal and independent audits of the management of resources allocated by the competent authorities for law enforcement activities, including the establishment of standards of transparency;
- "Individual performance" contracts concluded with the employees of PAs and strengthening of management, building "team spirit", promoting participation in teams and staff renewal;
- Specialized tools for monitoring public services like "Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys";
- Specialized tools to support changes in public services like "Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI)";
- Specialized procedures for protecting "whistleblowers";
- Dedicated Gateways between National and/or Ministerial Anti-corruption Commissions and government services in charge of wildlife police;
- Procedures for testing the quality and integrity of the public services of PAs modeled on the equivalent procedures of the private sector such as "customer/user ghosts" tests;
- Etc.

Thus, tools used to promote good governance often target the "centre" (ministries, directorates, agencies) rather than the periphery (PAs). This is because in most African contexts, the governance model is highly centralized. Consequently, bad examples are usually transmitted from the centre to the periphery (centrifugal), rather than the reverse (centripetal). Strategies and tools for improving law enforcement, including wildlife or PAs should target the centre more than the periphery.

For PA conservation stakeholders, this basically implies that the enhancement of governance (see the "Roadmap for PAs in Africa") cannot be limited to local governance (proper management of resources in PAs, relations with the local population of PAs) or in other words, hyper-local relations (relations with villages). Conservation stakeholders, foremost among which are very influential donors and international programmes, should also intensify law enforcement actions using appropriate toolkits, including tools for monitoring patrols and field activities like MIST.

¹⁰ SMART will be tested in the world, especially in Gabon, in 2013

¹¹ « Investing in Governance - Being a Smart Donor in the Forest Sector », OfirDrori, LAGA, 2013



Photo Conservation Justice (Luc Mathot)

Conclusion

Lessons in governance learned through the implementation of MIST in Gabon, constraints on the introduction of "appropriate technology", bottom-up orientation and transparency are some of the challenges to be addressed in Central and West Africa, characterized by the top-down approach and conflicts of interest.

However, there is a growing mobilization of stakeholders "motivated" by good governance in the public and private sectors, in official development assistance and above all in civil society. Conservation stakeholders have had enough of the empty slogan of "capacity building" for only the capacity of corrupt officials is strengthened because laws, particularly those relating to accountability and corruption, have not been enforced in any way upstream.

Thus, it is necessary to put the horse before the cart; it is necessary to start to enforce (and rigorously monitor the enforcement) of laws before thinking of amending them, consolidating financial and material resources or furthering the training of senior staff. In this context, an LEM such as MIST is not enough - it is a necessity and a high priority in all protected areas in Africa!

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Why SMART?

SMART (Spatial Monitoring And Reporting Tool) has been developed in response to the recognition that traditional tools, technologies and resources are not stemming the illegal killing and trading of endangered species and the resulting loss of threatened and highly valued biodiversity, such as tigers, rhinos, elephants, great apes and their habitats.

There are a number of reasons why our best efforts to date have yet to meet this challenge. A critical issue is the growing gap between the sophistication of those involved in the illegal capture and trade in wildlife and the number, skill levels and motivation of the personnel committed to enforcing anti-poaching laws.

SMART was designed to help bridge this gap. Its combination of software and training materials provides protected area authorities and community groups with the ability to empower staff, boost motivation, increase efficiency, and promote credible and transparent monitoring of the effectiveness of anti-poaching efforts. SMART can do this because it is more adaptive and intuitive to use than other monitoring technologies now in use, and because it has more advanced analytical and reporting functions.

More specifically

- SMART provides timely and accurate information on where, how and by whom poaching, illegal logging and other direct threats to biodiversity are occurring. It allows for the collection of up-to date field and intelligence data, and enables rapid feedback and communication between protected area managers and frontline enforcement staff. It quantitatively measures the impact of anti-poaching efforts in order to judge which tactics yield the best results and which ones need to be modified, thereby greatly improving the evaluation and strategic planning of enforcement operations.
- SMART introduces accountability into anti-poaching efforts. It gives government agencies, managers and donors the ability to monitor and assess the cost-effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. Park and community reserve managers can use it as a tool to measure job performance and help motivate field staff.
- SMART is driven by the conservation community, building on existing field-based experience and expertise and ensuring that SMART responds directly to the needs of field managers.
- SMART is open-source, nonproprietary and free to obtain. It is supported by a long-term business plan, which will enable future development and modification to meet the evolving needs of field based users. It is easy to use and can be translated into the languages of its end users.
- SMART is fully compatible with existing and complementary tools such as CyberTracker and MIST, and has been created for integration with mobile data-gathering platforms.

More info:

<http://www.smartconservationsoftware.org/Resources.aspx>



Photo Conservation Justice (Luc Mathot)

Job offer in DRC Technical advisor Provincial Office Biodiversity and Forest Program GIZ

Your responsibilities

For the province of South Kivu, the program searches a motivated technical advisor. He/she will deal with all aspects of the three main themes: forest management, biodiversity protection and reform of state structures. You also integrate short-term consultants and you stay in touch with other projects and donors in the province. You work in this very exciting field in the provincial capital of South Kivu (Bukavu) in a small program office. You have a team of local staff that can help in issues of forest management, the reform of the state and the protection of biodiversity. Your partners are the technical team of the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism, the Ministry of the province and the authorities of the Institute for the Protection of Nature. Other partner organizations, ministries, etc. such as the Ministry of Agriculture are included in the wider circle of partners. You will be working in the province with quite some independence but in close contact with the program director and you assist in all tasks concerning the development of the program at

provincial and national level, but also assisting the donor and sector coordination.

Your profile

You have completed a university or professional university degree in forestry, ecology, geography or similar field of study and you have earned some experience abroad. You are passionate about topics such as nature conservation and environmental protection, management of protected areas, biodiversity conservation, as well as forest management, and grass-roots democracy and local governance and have already gained several years of experience in these areas. You have experience in working with the state administration or in a public company for the management of protected areas. You like to work with other national and international partners to find solutions to complex issues in the field of organizational and personal development. In these subject areas, you also have some years of consulting experience. You are willing to collaborate on reports and administrative procedures where you want to integrate your communication skills. In a stressed environment you stay calm and do the work that must be done. You like to go interact with people, you can inspire others and carry them but as well you can take yourself back to let the partner to the fore. In addition, you are fluent in German, French and English.

More info: <http://www.giz.de/en/jobs/3109.html>

Consultancy

The **BACoMaB** - "Banc d'Arguin, Coastal and Marine Biodiversity – Trust Fund limited" is looking for a specialist of governance of "Conservation Trust Funds registered under the English law" for its **organizational audit**. The consultation will take place in Nouakchott - Mauritania, from May 23th to June 4th, 2013. Interested consultants can contact Frederic Hautcoeur for more info (see here after) and send a financial and technical proposal including CV. Frederic.hautcoeur@eco-consult.com

Deadline is... now.

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