


EMERGING COUNTRIES FADING DICHOTOMY IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?

INÊS ROSA





INÊS ROSA [1961-2015]

Nasceu em Dakar (Senegal) e licenciou-se em Economia, pela Universidade de Brasília. Frequentou no ISEG o Mestrado em “Cooperação Internacional”, tendo a sua tese obtido a classificação de 19 valores, e iria iniciar na mesma instituição o doutoramento em Estudos de Desenvolvimento.

Ingressou na Administração Pública portuguesa em 1983, tendo acompanhado e participado nas negociações da adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias. Entre 1992 e 1995 foi Adjunta do Gabinete do Secretário de Estado da Cooperação do XII Governo Constitucional, José Manuel Brios e Gala.

Em 1996 foi nomeada Diretora de Serviços dos Assuntos Comunitários do Instituto da Cooperação Portuguesa e, posteriormente, vogal e vice-Presidente do Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento, até à sua extinção, em 2012. Assumiu o cargo de Presidente do IPAD, em regime de substituição, entre 21 de Julho de 2005 e 25 de Setembro do mesmo ano. Enquanto dirigente, deixa uma marca indelével na definição e coordenação da política de cooperação portuguesa.

Estava colocada na Direção de Serviços das Relações Externas e Alargamento da Direção Geral dos Assuntos Europeus, tendo assegurado a representação nacional no Grupo do Conselho “Amigos da Presidência”, que negociou os Regulamentos relativos aos Instrumentos Financeiros da Acção Externa do quadro financeiro plurianual 2014-2020. Ao longo da sua carreira, participou e representou Portugal em diversas Cimeiras e múltiplos Fora, nomeadamente no âmbito das Nações Unidas, União Europeia, OCDE/CAD, CPLP e Ibero-Americana.

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EDIÇÃO

Instituto Diplomático

Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Largo do Rilvas

1399-030 Lisboa

Portugal

REVISÃO DO TEXTO

Luísa Pinto Teixeira

DESIGN

B2 Design | José Brandão | Justine de la Cal

IMPRESSÃO

GIO Gabinete Impressor Offset

DEPÓSITO LEGAL

?????

ISBN

978-989-8140-23-4

EMERGING COUNTRIES
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LISBON, NOVEMBER 2015



GOVERNO DE
PORTUGAL

MINISTÉRIO DOS NEGÓCIOS
ESTRANGEIROS

iD
INSTITUTO
DIPLOMÁTICO

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Returning to the University 30 years after obtaining an Economics degree has been absolutely adventurous, and was only made possible with the inspiration and continuous support of Zé and my daughters, Inês and Francisca. Having the professional and personal conditions allowed me to fulfill my desire to pursue with graduate studies.

The initial conversation with Prof. Joana Pereira Leite, as coordinator of the International Cooperation and Development Masters at ISEG, and her continued support over the last two years were most encouraging.

A very special word of gratitude is due to my supervisor, Prof. Manuel Ennes Ferreira, for his innumerable suggestions and enthusiastic assistance and support from the very beginning.

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NOTA DE ABERTURA

Ana Martinho

É para mim, enquanto Secretária-Geral do MNE, motivo de grande orgulho ver editado este trabalho da Inês Rosa. Não se trata apenas da justa homenagem à colega e amiga, precocemente desaparecida, mas sobretudo de poder partilhar o seu profundo conhecimento sobre a temática da cooperação para o desenvolvimento.

Ao longo da sua carreira profissional, a Inês construiu um pensamento crítico sobre a cooperação, tendo desempenhado um papel importante na definição da política portuguesa de ajuda ao desenvolvimento e, por isso, da política externa do nosso país.

Estou certa de que este livro representa um contributo importante para o estudo e reflexão das questões da cooperação, transmitindo não só o contributo académico, mas sobretudo a valiosa experiência que a Inês construiu ao longo dos anos de trabalho nesta área.

Esta é a justa homenagem tanto à profissional exemplar e dedicada como à colega de tantos anos.

Obrigada Inês.



FOREWORD

Manuel Ennes Ferreira [ISEG/University of Lisbon]

Emerging countries: fading dichotomy in development cooperation?, the subject chosen by Inês Rosa for her Master's dissertation, and which is now published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an acknowledgement of her personal and professional life, could not be more relevant within the framework of international cooperation for development. Contrary to what may be hastily thought, the issue here addressed does not focus solely on international aid – flows, mechanisms, donors and receptors, covering in addition a wider issue: the emergence of new actors in international relations who challenge the traditional separation between developed and developing countries, and which requires a new international institutional architecture, a fact appropriately stressed by Gore (2013)^[1].

This has not been an easy task and what lies ahead does not look promising. Amidst the resistance to change, i.e., the maintenance of the status quo, and the leap towards a new philosophy of action by the multilateral institutions, fears of a new path will mark for quite some time how this new reality will be confronted. But what is this new reality in the field of cooperation for development? It is a new scenario, different from the 2000 United Nations stage when the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were approved. At the time, and in order to bring to the forefront the issue of development funding, the 2002 Monterey Conference became the outward side of the debate on the differing forms of financial support. Among the various modalities, the

[1] Gore, C. (2013), Introduction – The new development cooperation landscape: actors, approaches, architecture, *Journal of International Development*, vol. 25, pp.769–786. See also Ocampo, J.A. (2010), “Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance”, *Journal of Globalization and Development*, vol.1, n°1, pp.0-27

Official Development Aid (ODA) was consistently recognized as a most significant one and therefore the necessity of its increase was stressed, in order to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. The framework was then clear: donor countries and recipient countries. However, the rate with which various countries incorporated in an increasing heterogeneous group that integrates the developing countries has since then stemmed. In terms of notoriety, the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), established in 2001 and later extended to South Africa, placed on the agenda new countries that had strong internal dynamics and aspired external visibility. Posing as countries that supported other developing countries in various forms, while remaining in the group of bilateral ODA beneficiaries from the DAC/OECD and multilateral institutions, with the exception of Russia, they became at the same time donor countries of international aid.

If it is a fact that their participation in the world economy has increased significantly, however, whether addressed from the perspective of international trade or from foreign direct investment (FDI) their weight in international institutions has not match this dynamic yet, a fact well-illustrated by the IMF case. Even with the problems that have hit them in the recent years, and which led some authors to question if they have not been over-valued (Pant, 2013)^[2], the fact is that many of these countries insist on being acknowledged as actors with

a role they can play at a regional or world level. In that regard, the G-20 was the initial, and very clear, step for them, that is, it was a pragmatic institutional response to the current global power relations and which may contribute to a new architecture of global governance (Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2011)^[3].

[2] Pant, H. (2013), "The BRICS Fallacy", Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol.36, n°3, pp.91-105

[3] Ocampo, José Antonio and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2011) "From the G-20 to a Global Economic Coordination Council," *Journal of Globalization and Development*: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 9,

So what repercussions derive from this reality for the international cooperation for development? From the onset, and as highlighted by Kim and Lee (2013)^[4], it is necessary to acknowledge that “the changing dynamics of the world including the global financial crisis and climate change suggest that the global challenges are different from what had been expected when the High Level Forum process and Millennium Development Goals were begun in the beginning of the 20th century” (p.787). These authors further stress that the central question that needs to be addressed is that “development cooperation can no longer be dominated by traditional donors only since the global challenges of today are far graver than those we faced at the turn of the new millennium, and we need many actors and fresh action to tackle these challenges” (p.799).

And in fact, it is only a matter of common sense to accept that international aid from the traditional donors, be them bilateral or multilateral, is not yet, and will not in the coming years, be confined to them. It is based on these issues that Inês Rosa begun her research, choosing the assertion cases of Brazil, China and India in Africa. Sadly, Africa remains the region where the difficulties of social and economic development are more evident, marked by a significant level of political instability and conflict. In global terms, Africa remains a first destination of ODA^[5].

Contrary to what rhetoric may at times deceive or what naïve interpretations may lead to believe, it is difficult to accept that the drivers for cooperation for development, namely in the form of ODA, are absolutely altruistic

[4] Kim, E. M. and Lee, J. A. (2013), “Busan and beyond: South Korea and the transition from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness”, *Journal of International Development*, vol.25, pp.787–801

[5] The leading position is still recurrent, albeit the existence of annual variations on the donors parameters. The strong relation between the European Union and the group of African countries places the latter as the lead beneficiaries of the bilateral relation, even if occasionally such does not happen. As an example, and according to OECD (2015), “European Union institutions”, in *Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action*, OECD Publishing, Paris, “the bilateral ODA (from EU institutions) is primarily focused on Eastern Europe (31%) and sub-Saharan Africa (28%)”, p.200.

or ethically irreprehensible. When comparing the practice of the various donors, the new and the traditional, some authors stress that the difficulty to obtain a greater cooperation and coordination between them derives not only from the structure of

[6] Chandy, L. and Kharas, H. (2011), "Why can't we all just get along? The practical limits to international development cooperation", *Journal of International Development*, vol. 23, pp. 739–751.

[7] Fuchs, A., Nunnenkamp, P. and Öhler, H. (2015), "Why Donors of Foreign Aid Do Not Coordinate: The Role of Competition for Export Markets and Political Support", *The World Economy*, vol.38, n°2, pp.255-285

[8] The earlier study of Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000), "Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?", *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 5, n°1, pp.33-63, provided evidence that "the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients" (p.33).

[9] Walz, J. and Ramachandran, V. (2010), *Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance*, CGD Working Paper 273.

[10] Fuchs, A.; Dreher, A. and Nunnenkamp, P. (2014), "Determinants of Donor Generosity: A Survey of the Aid Budget Literature", *World Development*, vol. 56, pp. 172–199.

[11] Zhang, Y., Gu, J. and Chen, Y. (2015), *China's engagement in international development cooperation: the state of the debate*, Institute of Development Studies, UK.

the international aid system (Chandy and Kharas, 2011)^[6], but also from their conflicting interests, of various natures – economic or political. As Fuchs, Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2015) remark: "commercial competition with large non-DAC donors such as China or India is likely to further undermine the coordination of aid" (p.276)^[7]. This necessarily indicates that ultimately, each donor pursues its own interests.

This last aspect is fundamental. Ever since Alesina and Dollar (2000) began their work on the motivations and self-interests of the donor countries, more studies followed^[8]. Walz and Ramachandran (2010) produced a very interesting report on these studies^[9], later updated by Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp (2014)^[10]. Attention, however, recently shifted to the non-DAC donors, namely the emerging countries that are simultaneously receptors and, currently, donors. Zhang, Gu and Chen (2015), for example, look at China's engagement in international cooperation for development^[11]. Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2012) tackle India's motivations as a donor country^[12], and the importance of the economic factor is clearly explained on a study of the Confederation of Indian Industry

and the World Trade Organization (CII/WTO (2013)^[13]. As for Brazil, Burges (2014) contributes with an insight to the understanding of the country's motivations^[14]. The charge frequently made about the bilateral aid of DAC countries – the tied aid – is also backed by the analysis of these three countries, which absolutely configures what Knack and Smets (2013) call their work: aid tying and donor fragmentation^[15]. Is this a situation where the international aid practiced by these new emerging countries does not differ from the traditional aid of the DAC countries? And which, in the African case used by Inês Rosa to frame the action of these new donors, is just a competition situation reduced to a mere substitution of the external actor? This is a broad subject whose real dimension will only be asserted in the coming years. However, academic analysis should deprive itself of immediate passions and instead reflect on the subject, following Ayers (2013) ...: "commentators across the political spectrum have increasingly drawn attention to a 'new scramble for Africa'. This 'new scramble' marks the latest chapter of imperialist engagement, with not only Western states and corporations but also those of 'emerging economies' seeking to consolidate their access to African resources and markets. [this article] seeks to challenge commonplaces and related narratives. Firstly, the highly questionable representations of the scale and perceived threat of emerging powers' (particularly China's) involvement in Africa, in contrast to the silences, hypocrisy and paternalistic representation of the historical role of the West"^[16].

[12] Fuchs, A. and Vadlamannati, K. C. (2012), *The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India's Aid Motives*, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper Series, n° 532.

[13] CII/WTO (2013), *India-Africa: south-south trade and investment for development*, Confederation of Indian Industry and the World Trade Organization.

[14] Burges, S. (2014), "Brazil's International Development Co-operation: Old and New Motivations", *Development Policy Review*, vol. 32, n°3, pp.355–374.

[15] Knack, S. and Smets, L. (2013), "Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation", *World Development*, vol. 44, pp. 63–76.

[16] Alison J. Ayers (2013) "Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a 'New Scramble for Africa'", *New Political Economy*, vol.18, n°2, pp.227-257.

And this leads to the final and central aspect of Inês Rosa's dissertation – the substance of the challenge to the existing dichotomy in international cooperation for development: developed countries on one side and developing countries on the opposite, meaning respectively the donor and recipient countries of international aid. After all, what is the role of the new emerging countries that are at once donors and recipients? More importantly still, and an issue that Inês Rosa clearly shows with the account of the existing debates within the more important international fora, the G20, the European Union, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation Meeting and the United Nations: what role do these emerging countries attribute to themselves? If, on the one hand, they wish to show that they do not belong to the category of developing countries (the South), on the other hand, and concomitantly, they do not want to be equated with the countries of the North ... and yet, they pride themselves on affirming that they already are as indisputable as the latter. The rhetoric is, as Inês Rosa remarks, an important weapon of assertion on the classical confrontation between North-South interests. Meanwhile, as the author also remarks, these countries are engaged in a comfortable and profitable double game, which they play with their self-ambiguity. At the moment, they do not want to be called donors, arguing that theirs is an altruistic cooperation between brothers. They prefer instead to be called 'partners'. Until when?

My final remark, a well-deserved word for Inês. She was the best student of the Master's program on Development and International Cooperation at ISEG/University of Lisbon. Inês attended my courses on International Cooperation for Development and African Economy, receiving

the highest classification on the latter, and for that reason she was awarded the SumolCompal Prize. With a sound training in economy, Inês had built up a wealth of experience in the field of Portuguese cooperation. The privilege of being challenged to be her dissertation supervisor was only matched by the pleasant working conversations. Her memory will be honored if this publication becomes a stimulus to the future students of the Master's in DIC.

EMERGING COUNTRIES
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IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?**



Acronyms

ABC	Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazil)
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CIB	China, India and Brazil
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G8	Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Union
G20	Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Union
G77	Group of 77 – established in 1964 by 77 developing countries. Presently has 134 member countries
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
O5	Out-reach 5 – Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TECP	Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (India)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
WTO	World Trade Organization

Preface

Over the last years I had the privilege of closely following and participate in the definition of development cooperation policy at various levels – national (Portuguese), European Union, OECD/DAC and in the wider United Nations framework. This has given me the opportunity to observe and reflect upon what many consider to be the major change in international relations: the power-shift and consequent geo-strategic transformation that is taking place at the global level before our eyes at an incredible pace, due essentially to the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), later transformed into BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa. The entry of these countries in the international arena on a global dimension has had various consequences, and is bound to further impact the system if they continue to gain a relative global weight in the coming years, even if at a slower pace.

Various important issues would be interesting to study in relation to the impact of these emerging countries – especially China, India and Brazil –, on the formulation of public policy in the field of development cooperation. For example, has the appearance of these countries had an impact on the conditionality of aid used by DAC donors? Or will it have one in the near future? Has it changed the choice of priority countries or sectors to which aid is allocated? Notwithstanding the importance of these questions, what seems to be a greater challenge is to determine if the rise of these countries, in spite of major resistances, is leading to systemic changes in the framework of institutional development cooperation. That is what this essay attempts to delineate, acknowledging beforehand that more in-depth observation and analysis will have to be carried out.

Introduction

This essay introduces the key idea that we are currently facing a major shift in international cooperation, notably in development cooperation, a situation that has been in the making over the last decade, but which has become especially visible since the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and consolidated ever since. The objective here is to outline one of the major changes that is occurring in the field of development cooperation, and which begun in the past ten/twelve years as a result of the economic emergence of several countries and the subsequent impact on the international scene. The emergence of these countries has the potential to structurally transform the traditional dichotomy between developed and developing countries that has prevailed notably since the end of the Second World War, and which is likely to leave its imprint on the framework of development cooperation as well as in various multilateral frameworks at the global level. The countries that are having a greater systemic impact are China, India and Brazil (CIB in particular), although other developing countries are also clearly on the rise, as described in detail by Deepak Nayyar (2013).

Despite the vast literature concerning the rise of these new state actors in international cooperation, and in particular in development cooperation, few authors mention the possibility that we might be facing a period of a paradigm shift. Are international organizations adapting systemically to the impending process by the major emerging powers? In our view, there already exist some specific examples (processes or institutional arrangements) that depict this systemic change.

The essay begins by briefly describing the mainstream paradigm in development cooperation and international cooperation, namely the current divide between two categories of countries (developed versus developing), its origins and evolution, and outlines the rise of CIB and the shifts in geo-strategic power entailed by this motion, which may very well become, in historic and geo-political terms, as structurally significant as the fall of the Berlin Wall. This significance was first advanced by Eric Hobsbawn when referring to the BRIC countries in one of his last interviews in 2010^[1], and has sustained itself subsequently, as a result of the continued economic performance of this group of countries.

Special attention will be given to the expanding economic role of China, India and Brazil in Africa over the last ten/twelve years, particularly in the field of development cooperation, that clearly indicate how these countries are capable of projecting power beyond their border regions, which in turn boosts

their image more like developed countries and as game-changers for recipients countries and donors.

The expanding role of these countries in various fields has led to the (re-)^[2] emergence of South-South cooperation and the increase of triangular cooperation. The importance currently attributed to these aid partnerships appears to be directly linked to the dynamics of the emergence of CIB in international cooperation and in development cooperation in particular. The emergence of these countries as global players, at first in the G8+O5^[3] context in 2007, but rapidly evolving to the G20^[4]

[1] As quoted by Sidaway (2012).

[2] Mawdsley (2012) and Quadir (2013) refer systematically to these countries as re-emerging development partners due to their activity in this field in the 1960's and 70's.

[3] G8 – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Union.
O5 – Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.

[4] Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Union.

format, has exposed the decline of the simple dichotomy between developed and developing countries, or of “North” versus “South”.

Paradoxically, or not, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the fairly outdated “North-South” rhetoric is gaining ground in recent years precisely as a consequence of the strength of these countries of the South.

Further examples of this change are the institutional arrangements in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)^[5] and the recent experience of the European Union, with the decision of thoroughly differentiate its cooperation with third countries upon which it began treating the developing countries that belong to the G20 as a substantially different reality.

In face of the above mentioned contexts, the traditional dichotomy between developed and developing countries seemingly propels the appearance of three categories of countries – developing, emerging and developed.

Lastly, the United Nations framework is also looked into, despite the fact that changing traditional divides is obviously more difficult to accomplish in this highly politicized forum. Nevertheless, changes at this level would be an important accomplishment as major multilateral negotiations are at stake.

The chapter closes with some final considerations about what appears to be a changing reality – although not in terms of terminology in face of existing resistances, indeed a *de factum* shift in power that chiefly permeates international global negotiations and suggests the entailment of a paradigmatic change of relations in the field of development cooperation and in multilateral negotiations at large.

^[5] An international forum created during the IV High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011).

Notwithstanding the fact that the theme of this essay, is still relatively recent and difficult to discuss, it is one of the most interesting subjects to study in this field, with the multiple branches in the framework of development cooperation and subsequently in all major economic multilateral negotiations.

A narrative approach will be used, based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of information from a variety of sources, namely books, publications, scientific articles, institutional documentation and official speeches, and also articles and interviews published in specialized media and in dedicated internet sites.

1. The Traditional Framework of Development Cooperation

Although the origins of development cooperation can be traced back further in time, the relevant literature places the political appearance of the issue of promoting the development of less developed countries in President Truman's inaugural Four Point Speech in 1949^[6], in particular the Fourth Point that explicitly mentions that

“Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half of the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.” (TRUMAN 1949).

[6] See Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003:7), Ridell (2008:24), Knutsson (2009:9) and Rist (2014:70).

[7] The term was first used by the French scientist Alfred Sauvy in 1952 in an article published by the magazine *L'Observateur*. The title of the article was precisely “Three Worlds, one planet” and soon the concept of a third world came into vogue, essentially because it was useful to describe, explain and therefore formulate policies in the prevailing context of the Cold War (with the USA and its western allies being part of the first world and the USSR and its allies as part of the second world).

Several milestones, namely the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 1955 that initiated the non-aligned movement and forged the concept of the Third World^[7]; the process that led to the creation of the Development Assistance Committee inside the OECD in 1960/61; the Brandt Reports at the

beginning of the 1980's and the North-South divide; the "Washington Consensus" in the 1990's and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) at the turn of the century, have looked at and analyzed the world as being essentially in a permanent state of dichotomy, that of developed countries *vis-à-vis* developing countries. This division, despite the various designations it has received has always been used until recently. Under-developed countries, third world countries, dependent countries, peripheral countries, South countries or simply developing countries as they are currently designated, are all different names that relate basically to the same reality, against industrialized countries, first world countries, countries of the North or of the Center, or simply developed countries^[8].

And despite the fact that the division between the first and the second world has almost disappeared after the end of the Cold War, some authors argue that the term "third world" still retains a certain appeal because it draws on notions such as "worse", "less", "inferior" and "backward", which in turn refer to the notion of under-development (Solarz (2012a). An appeal that is closely linked to the fact that some developed countries continue to consider their level of development higher than other countries, and most especially higher than other developing countries, and still use the narrative of injustice, exploitation and inequality to their advantage. Solarz (2014:1570) even considers the term "South" to be more outdated than "third world", which is questionable. According to Solarz, the geographical determinism contained

in the terminology "North" and "South" is in serious contradiction to the character of development processes which are by definition constituted by movement and change. In contrast, the concept of "third

[8] This continuous dichotomy is explained in detail by Solarz (2014).

[9] See UNDP (2013) HDR- The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World.

world” is geographically open and undefined. However, in current development cooperation the term “third world” has virtually disappeared, while “North” and “South” have gained ground^[9], as the development of many countries of the “South” has given the term a positive connotation.

The brisk progress that has been taking place over the last couple of decades in relation to the economic development of a progressively larger group of developing countries, has brought them steadily closer to the levels of development of the developed countries. Concurrently, a group of the less developed countries is not progressing at all, or is progressing at a very slow pace, creating an expanding differentiation inside the group of developing countries. This marked difference is best illustrated by the existing contrast between Niger, the poorest country in the world, and Chile, which has already surpassed Portugal in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). Their HDI's are 0,337 and 0,822 respectively, with a *per capita* income in purchasing power parity at 2011 prices (UNDP HRD 2013) of 873 USD and 20 804 USD respectively. Notwithstanding these differences, Niger and Chile are considered developing countries, while Portugal, Romania and Bulgaria, with a lower HDI and per capita GNI compared to Chile, are in the developed country group.

Nearly sixty years ago, in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the wave of African independencies was underway and the negotiations regarding development assistance were just beginning, the distinctions between donor and recipient countries was much clearer – “at this time it was much easier to define which countries were in need of development and therefore recipient countries and which countries were donors. Today these lines are blurred”, according to the recent report of the European Parliament (2014:34). Several countries that sixty

years ago were ODA recipients are current donors, as for example South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, but also Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece and, of course, several oil producing Arab countries. Since 1970, thirty-five countries have left the list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipient countries of the DAC/OECD and are now developed countries for development assistance purposes, as stated in OECD (2011). But what makes matters more complicated and “blurred” is the fact that various countries, namely the emerging economies, are becoming increasingly important development donors, major trading partners of other developing countries, and are responsible for significant foreign direct investment flows in poorer developing countries. However, these major emerging countries retain their ODA eligibility and insist on keeping their developing country status in numerous situations. China, India and Brazil are the greatest examples of this ambiguity. There are also other significant new donors, albeit on a more regional or modest scale, such as South Africa and Turkey.

Solarz (2012b:560) recognizes that currently, the existing dichotomy between a rich “North” and a poor “South”, concepts that were popularized by the First Brandt Report in 1980^[10], are not a matter of countries or territories but one of societies, since the dividing line crosses many dimensions in space and in time – “this is because globalization has constructed a multilayered network made up of many Brandt lines superimposed on reality in every dimension – global, regional and local”.

Even though a clear dichotomy between developed and developing coun-

tries has existed for decades in the minds of policy makers and academia, this seems to be changing as globalization brings to the center, emerging or catch-up countries that were once clearly part of the periphery.

[10] Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North South: A Programme for Survival*, report that was chaired by the German Prime Minister and was extremely influential at the time.

2. The Appearance of the Emerging Countries

In order to understand the dimension of the appearance of the emerging economies, a brief description of their evolution over the last decade will be made, beginning at the turn of the century, in terms of trade, investment and development cooperation, especially in Africa, since this movement clearly elucidates the game-changing nature of their emergence – only major economies are able to project their influence far from their direct neighborhood .

In fact, Jim O'Neill's famous 2001 forecast, stating that the emerging economies of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) would become major world economies in the following decades, catching up with the dominant G6 (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States of America), has not only been confirmed but seems to be happening at an even faster pace than initially predicted. Despite the fact that they currently face huge economic and financial challenges, the economic performances of Brazil and India have also surpassed Goldman Sach's expectations, although not as overwhelming as China. In less than a decade these four economies developed into world growth engines, being responsible for most of the world economy's dynamism, especially after the outbreak of the 2008 economic and financial crises, although recently their performance has slowed down, especially Brazil's and Russia's. At present, the BRIC are increasingly larger economies in relative terms and important world trade engines that attract substantial foreign direct investment, and have an increasingly important role as foreign direct investors themselves. The latter is

especially significant in the case of China, but Brazil and India have also recently surpassed the traditional countries that invest in Africa (SAIIA 2013).

THE ROLE OF EMERGING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

The changes taking place on a global scale concerning the relative distribution of power at the geo-economic level have been very significant since the beginning of the new millennium and as already stated, have become even more notorious after the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis of 2008. The dynamics of the economic growth of some emerging powers, namely China, India and Brazil, are particularly significant according to many authors. These giants have led to the undeniable perception of new state actors that must embark in global governance, and that this affects, specifically in the field of development cooperation.^[11] The development impact of these countries is such that it is felt at a regional, and global scale.

The African continent, which for several decades, especially in the 1980's and 1990's, had the status of the "lost continent", is a particularly interesting setting to observe the evolving role of these emerging countries, and how their impact occurs in regions that are not their traditional backyards. A brief look at the statistics concerning these countries' trade with Africa, at their foreign direct investment in Africa (although data may not be totally reliable at the country level), and at the statistics of their development cooperation (which is also not very reliable)

provides the insight necessary to understand this issue.

Finally, a brief reference to the mechanisms of institutional dialogue that these emerging countries have created in order to frame and promote their respective relations with African countries will be made.

[11] Literature about the rise of the emerging countries in international development is vast and in continuous production. See research programme regarding the BRICS and Rising Powers in International Development Programme – www.ids.ac.uk/idsresearch/brics-and-rising-powers.

CHINA, INDIA AND BRAZIL'S EVOLVING ROLE IN AFRICA

TRADE

Although Africa's total trade has more than quadrupled in nominal terms from 230 to 1024 billion USD between 2000 and 2013, as a result of an expanding world globalization, Africa's share of world trade continues to diminish (3% in 2013). However, the geographic patterns of this trade has changed progressively over this period, in terms of imports and exports (**ANNEXES 1 to 4**). In fact, the European Union (EU) continues to be Africa's main export market in 2013, responsible for almost 40% of African exports, although in 2000 it was responsible for more than half of this market. The USA remains an important market for African products in 2013, although clearly a diminishing one compared to 2000. It is interesting to note that South Africa, often included in the emerging countries category, and which is a member of BRICS and the G20, also increased its market share of African exports throughout this period. And that Brazil, India and above all China, have become progressively very significant markets for African exports. Brazil represents 3% of the market for African exports at the end of this period (at the same level as Japan), and India absorbs in the same year almost 6% of Africa's total exports, approaching the United States market. But it is China that makes the biggest progression, going from around 3% to 13% of the continent's total exports, becoming Africa's main trade partner if the European countries are considered individually and not as a sole entity, as they were initially referred to at the beginning of this paragraph.

Looking at the import side, that is, to the countries that supply the African continent, a significant change in traditional geographic trade patterns may also be observed. Once again, the EU maintains its lead as

the continent's main supplier, but its relative importance has been shrinking gradually over the years, from being responsible for 45% of African imports in 2000 to 32% thirteen years later. The USA, which in 2000 was an important supplier to Africa, was again overtaken by China in 2013. In fact, the latter, which was responsible for 3 % of African imports in 2000, in 2013 was already supplying roughly 15% of the African market. India's position also increased significantly over this period, becoming an important African supplier, and Brazil saw its market share increase albeit at a much lower level.

A very rapid qualitative analysis of these trade flows allow various authors^[12] to conclude that for the moment, the structure of African trade with the rest of the world, including with emerging countries, has not changed in any significant way. On the contrary, if anything, one can observe a deepening of Africa's traditional profile as supplier of natural resources and commodities (low value added products), and as importer of high value added equipment and consumer goods, a structure that seems to perpetuate Africa's insertion model in the world economy, which is basically the same since colonial times (Ayers 2012). Other authors defend, however, that a window of opportunity currently exists in relation to the industrial development of the continent (Nzau 2010 and Genevey 2013). At the continental level, the discourse about the necessary industrialization of these countries is strongly re-emerging, referring to a second opportunity of development, making use of the wealth generated by natural resources to climb up the value chain, adding more value domestically before exporting (UNECA 2013, 2014).

[12] Cirera (2013) and Ayers (2012)

INVESTMENT

A similar analysis of FDI flows to Africa has been greatly facilitated by the report published for the first time in 2014 by UNCTAD, covering the period 2001-2012, with data concerning bilateral investment of each of these countries by country destination (**ANNEX 5**).

It is possible to verify that Chinese FDI to the world has increased strikingly over the last decade, with annual flows of more than 110 billion USD, a little less than a third of the United States' FDI. And although in relative terms Africa is not a very significant destination for Chinese FDI, it has taken on a growing share of FDI on the continent. Chinese stock of FDI has evolved from being relatively modest in 2003 (491 million USD) to expressive values in 2013 (21 billion USD), also equivalent to a third of the stock of the United States' FDI in Africa in the same year.^[13]

The evolution observed in Chinese FDI depicts a structural change in the country's relations with the world, and with Africa, linking it closely to the global economy. However, in the case of Africa, and with the exception of South Africa, Chinese FDI has chiefly focused in oil or other natural resources producing countries – Algeria, Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Zambia, and only recently it began expanding to other African countries.

India's FDI profile is not so impressive, with a total stock of 80 billion USD around the world. Nevertheless, the African continent takes up more than 13 billion USD of this total. Seen in more detail, the vast majority of this investment occurs in Mauritius, a small island off the coast of East Africa, which is a development success story that relies on a strong Indian *diáspora*.

^[13] Portugal, for example, in 2005 had approximately the same stock of FDI in Africa as China (around 1,5 billion USD), but in 2012 it represents only one third of Chinese FDI on the continent, in spite of the growth of Portuguese FDI in Africa which reached 6,8 billion USD that year.

^[14] For an in-depth analysis of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian cooperation see Brautigam (2011), Chaturdevi (2012), Mawdsley (2012) and Sun (2014).

^[15] India is also a donor with a considerably long history, although it does not like to be called a donor (Mawdsley (2012:7). According to Quadir (2013:327), the various credit lines that India has extended mainly to governments in sub-Saharan Africa aim at “promoting Indian trade, specially its exports”, and also at “promoting India’s economic and political interests abroad”.

^[16] Contrary to China and India, Brazil, which has a long-standing coordinating unit (ABC – Agência Brasileira de Cooperação) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has always voiced great interest in trilateral cooperation, and has shown interest in establishing closer relations with the DAC/OECD, although shying away from accession. Brazil’s rhetoric regarding its development cooperation is very pronounced in terms of South-South cooperation, stating that it is above all an expression of solidarity and of relations among equals, and that is not “aid”. (Inoue and Vaz (2013) and Quadir (2013:324)).

^[17] The OECD estimates that global development finance reached 139 billion in 2012, with 8,4% being provided by non-DAC countries (OECD 2014:382). In spite of the limitations of this data, it seems more reliable than numerous tentative estimates made by various different authors. As stated by a prominent expert on Chinese cooperation (Brautigam 2010:26), “China does not report its official aid to the DAC, and estimates of its ODA are often vastly exaggerated.” The exaggeration of these estimates is clear when some say that Chinese aid could have reached 25 billion USD in 2009, as illustrated by Walz and Ramachandran (2010).

In what concerns Brazil, even though this country’s total stock FDI is significant, reaching 266 billion USD in 2012, its FDI in Africa is not very strong, especially if 2012, when important investments were made in Angola, is disregarded. In fact, in spite of Brazil’s diplomatic and commercial increasing role in Africa over the last decade, there has not been a major spillover effect in terms of its FDI.

From what was previously explained, it may be concluded that although there are many references to the emerging countries’ FDI role in Africa, it is China that has so far acquired a major position on the continent, due to its dimension, but also to the consistent and effective promotion of its investment, in articulation with other economic and political dimensions of its relations with Africa.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION^[14]

Although China, India^[15] and Brazil^[16] do not report their respective Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the OECD/DAC, this organization has been publishing estimates of concessional aid flows from these countries to developing countries for the past few years (OECD 2005-2014). ANNEX 6 contains OECD estimates for “ODA-type” flows from these countries, covering the period 2007-2012, although for Brazil only until 2010 .

Even taking into account the relative unreliability of the data^[17], it is possible to observe that the three emerging countries have been progressively increasing their development cooperation efforts over the last years. Brazil has still a modest level of assistance, but even so comparable to Portugal's absolute ODA levels, while India clearly surpasses this level, and China has an aid volume of approximately 2,8 billion USD in 2012, which puts it already in the range of Danish or Italian ODA.

Still according to OECD (2014), a significant part of Brazil's cooperation flows are multilaterally channeled, while most of Chinese and Indian cooperation are bilateral. Brazil's cooperation with Africa, which in 2010 represented 22,6% of its bilateral cooperation (IPEA, ABC (2013)), has however increased, gradually extending beyond its traditional focus, that used to be the lusophone countries.

Broken-down data concerning the destination of Indian and Chinese cooperation seems difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, based on statistics found in the new Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid^[18], that reveal that more than 50% of Chinese bilateral aid goes to Africa, it is possible to conclude that this continent has been receiving a growing share of Chinese aid. This makes China an important donor in Africa, essentially covering the whole of the continent and following (or perhaps leading?) the traditional donors' new tendency to increase the proportion of concessional loans versus grants^[19].

It is also important to keep in mind that development cooperation is a relevant instrument in any country's foreign policy tool-box, and that Brazil and India naturally use it in their respective campaigns for a United Nations Security Council permanent seat.

[18] This White Paper, covering the period 2010-2012, was published in June 2014, but is only available in Mandarin; it was consulted on 26.12.2014 in www.brookings.edu.

[19] Freitas and Mah (2012) note that the EU, and specifically the big member states, are progressively aligning their development cooperation to their more immediate economic interests, spurred by the challenge they feel coming from the emerging countries, particularly China.

INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

In addition to a strengthened economic relationship, which includes development cooperation, China, India and Brazil have also expanded their respective political and institutional relations with Africa. Here too, China stands out relatively to the other two emerging countries, taking into account the intensity and systematized framework that it has established for its political dialogue with the continent. Brazil has notoriously increased the number of its Embassies in Africa and also augmented the number of official visits, especially during President Lula da Silva's mandates (2003-2011)^[20],

^[20] This spurs the EU to also promote Summits with Africa, albeit with difficulty in keeping a regular calendar due to the EU's lack of unity in its foreign policy. In fact, the EU Summits took place in 2000, only to resume in 2007, 2010 and in 2014.

^[21] This spurs the EU to also promote Summits with Africa, albeit with difficulty in keeping a regular calendar due to the EU's lack of unity in its foreign policy. In fact the EU Summits took place in 2000 but then only in 2007, 2010 and in 2014.

going beyond the traditional lusophone partners, and since 2008 India has increased the number of African countries invited to its Summits. But it is China that leads the process of holding regular high-level dialogue with all the African countries, with an ever denser agenda, having institutionalized the FO-CAC Summits – Forum on China-Africa Cooperation –, which since 2000 occur every three years alternatively in China and Africa.^[21]

3.(Re-)Emergence of South-South and Triangular Cooperation

South-South cooperation and triangular or trilateral cooperation are aid partnerships that have existed for decades, although only lately they have invaded the development cooperation discourse^[22]. South-South cooperation is defined as the exchange of resources, human resources, technology and knowledge between developing countries, being therefore different from North-South cooperation precisely because it involves a developing country as provider/donor. Trilateral cooperation, on the other hand, does not have an internationally agreed definition, as recognized by DCD/OECD in a recent paper (OECD 2013). However, as a rule, trilateral cooperation involves three partners, one from the so called “North”, that joins a partner from the so called “South” (pivotal country) to cooperate in a third developing country.^[23] A fairly comprehensive list of examples of this type of trilateral cooperation can be found in OECD 2013: **ANNEX 4**.

These aid partnerships have their roots in the Cold War period and their origins can be traced back several decades to the creation of the Non-aligned countries movement, the Bandung Conference in 1955 and more specifically the Cairo Conference of 1962 on “The Problems of Economic Development”

[22] As is generally recognized, and confirmed by Esteves e Assunção (2014:1780), South-South cooperation “only gained new impetus in the 2000’s, when emerging powers became protagonists within the field.”

[23] Although many accept this definition, others do not. Triangular cooperation may also be merely trilateral cooperation involving two countries cooperating in a third developing country, for example, the USA cooperating with Poland or Estonia in countries of Eastern Europe. The USA has set up a fund for its cooperation with emerging donors, be they North or South – https://communities.usaidallnet.gov/st/sites/st/file/emerging_donors_and_st_062008_2.pdf, consulted 12/04/15. Portugal, a DAC member, also considers that its partnership with the European Commission in development programs that occur in PALOP countries is triangular cooperation.

that led to the institutionalization in 1964 of the Group of 77 (G77) in the framework of the United Nations. Later, in 1978, the UN Cooperation among developing countries.

However, despite the initial rhetoric that would periodically be revived at the follow-up meetings of this Action Plan, these aid partnerships were indeed quite marginal in the aid architecture framework of the last decades, especially since the retraction of South-South cooperation that followed the Chinese decision to look inwards^[24], and the debt crisis of the 1980's.

This cooperation has been responsible for small financial transfers – hardly any estimates is mentioned in the literature, and their practical effects have not been studied systematically and in-depth, either by providers, recipients or international organizations.

In fact, it was only with the emergence of CIB that South-South cooperation was suddenly revived and gained an increasing relevance. It is in this context that the international community and academia at large begun analyzing and reflecting on this phenomena, trying to understand it and even to relate to it, namely through the above mentioned “triangular cooperation”, the so-called “bridging aid modality” that combines North-South with South- South cooperation. The extensive literature that has been regularly produced in the last years concerning the emerging donors, South-South cooperation, triangular cooperation, and the institutional relevance that has been given in official documents (OECD/DAC, GPEDC and UN) are visible proof of the interest created by these new actors in

the field of development cooperation. As Mawdsely (2012:145) stresses, there are huge differences in rhetorical terms between traditional (North-South) cooperation and cooperation between developing countries

^[24] In the 1970's Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping strongly contracted China's external cooperation, admitting that the country itself was in need of assistance.

(South-South). But it is principally the Southern donors that always strive to emphasize that their cooperation is fundamentally different in nature, distancing themselves from what they consider to be the negative aspects of the traditional donors motivations and methods. It is in this line that North-South cooperation is qualified as a moral obligation of the rich countries (most of which are former colonial powers) vis-a-vis poorer ones, and it is cooperation that is practiced in a paternalistic way, with associated conditionalities and hidden economic and political agendas. In stark contrast to this approach, South-South cooperation is, according to the rhetoric of these same countries, free of conditionalities, “horizontal” by nature, which means allegedly among equals, based on strict principles of equality, partnership and mutual interest, and therefore not the product of any moral obligation or historical responsibility but rather the fraternal exercise of solidarity and support. Several other authors, such as Chandy (2011), Chaturdevi et al. (2012) and Quadir (2013), also refer basically in these terms to the justifying discourses regularly used by non-DAC donors, and especially emerging countries, and conclude recognizing that there are not many practical differences between these cooperations.

In addition, if the priorities and the objectives that sustain the different cooperations are analyzed, one is forced to recognize that a great diversity of approaches exist among the various donors, be it between DAC donors or non-DAC donors. In fact, although every DAC member subscribes to a number of broad principles, in reality each donor country pursues its development policy according to its national interests and sensitivities which vary over time, and do not even adhere entirely to DAC’s soft-law, which is not legally binding. One need only to read the donor peer review reports, which are easily found on the DAC/OECD website, in order to analyze the different

donor policies. These reports confirm, for example, that French development policy is very different from Swedish policy, that both are very different from Japanese development policy, and needless to say also very different from Portuguese policy^[25]. Each of these countries' development policies is determined by their respective foreign policies, albeit the alleged autonomy of development policy vis-a-vis foreign policy. The DAC countries simply share the commitment to dedicate more than 0,7 % of their GNI, or alternatively spend more than 100 MUSD a year on ODA, accept the definition of ODA, report accordingly at jointly agreed times and participate in the peerreview process^[26].

In a similar fashion, although not subject to any peer review or international accountability process, the non-DAC countries and specifically CIB have been expanding their own development policies over the years, with their distinctive historical relations, their economic and political interests in mind, and each of these national policies is obviously very different from one another.^[27]

Renzio and Seifert (2014:1869) recall that there is no common vision with

respect to South-South cooperation, and question the real differences that exist vis-a-vis North-South counter-part. The economic and political weight of emerging countries and their respective natural economic and political interests seem to indicate that relations with recipient countries are in fact strongly asymmetrical and not horizontal, as some wish to depict them.

[25] <http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/peerreviewsofdacmembers.htm> consulted 22/12/14

[26] See conditions for joining the DAC <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/joining-the-development-assistance-committee.htm> (consulted 22/12/14).

[27] See Chaturdevi et al (2012) for a brief description of the development cooperation policy of CIB.

4. The appearance of three categories of countries in development cooperation?

Even though the discourse of the (re)-emergent donors is very different from the one normally used by the DAC countries, and despite the fact that these emergent donors belong to the general category of “developing countries” and therefore also belong to the so-called “south”, it is very hard to credibly sustain the allegation that cooperation with these countries is processed in “partnerships among equals”, when clearly there are striking differences in development levels, in dimension, and in power^[28]. Each of the three countries that have been looked into (CIB) are major economic and political powers when compared to other developing countries, and even to many developed countries. These major emergent economies are now strong enough to project their foreign policy far beyond their immediate neighborhood, as illustrated in Chapter 2. In fact, in our view point they may not belong to the “south” anymore. In order to look into this phenomena more closely, one needs only to briefly look at its impact on different organizations or negotiations (G20 Development Work, Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the European Union’s development cooperation policy and last but not least, the United Nations Organization).

[28] Cooper et al (2007) and Khanna (2009) make the proposition that we are currently facing three worlds, with the second world being that of the emerging economies that can no longer be considered “third world” countries. Khanna’s expresses this idea directly on the title of his book “The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century”, whilst Cooper et al mention that “...a novel post bipolar triad of distinctive state types is gradually evolving: a first class club of members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); a new second tier of emerging economies (Economist 2006); and an extensive and heterogeneous third world (previously G77) of the rest (see special issue of International Affairs 2006 on emerging economies or emerging powers).” (pp 674).

DEVELOPMENT IN THE G20

In 2007, in what was called the Heiligendamm process, the traditional group of world leaders, the G8, initiated a trial dialogue with the most important emerging economies, O5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa), thought to reflect and encompass the enormous change in global economic power that had been occurring over the previous decade. This format, however, was quickly overtaken by the establishment of the G20 as the world's primary economic policy governing forum, in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It is in this context that a new category of countries seems to be recognized, the so-called "emerging countries", all members of the G20 that are not developed countries or regular developing countries. The various Declarations that have been adopted in the successive G20 Summits^[29] are proof of this innovation, and reveal a profound change in international relations that may constitute a divisive and decisive factor in many of the on-going multilateral negotiations.

Already in the first G20 Summit that took place in 15 November 2008,

in Washington, soon after the outbreak of the financial crisis, paragraph 14 of the Conclusions regarding Development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) stated that "we....urge both developed and emerging economies to undertake commitments consistent with their capacities and roles in the global economy". In subsequent Summits this policy line continues to be strengthened. In July 2010, at the Toronto Summit, a G20 Development Working Group is created; at the Seoul Summit a Development Consensus and its respective Action Plan

[29] See <http://g20.org> for access to G20 Conclusions adopted since 2008 (consulted 12.01.2014)

[30] Saint Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments (same internet site). Acharya (2013:199) refers to the new division between the "power South" and the "poor South", to describe developing countries that are part of the G20 and those that are not, stating that "a novelty of the G20 is that its membership is supposed to bridge the traditional North-South divide. Yet is the G20 representative of the developing world or reflexive of a new fault-line between the "poor South" and the "power South?""

is adopted, and at the Saint Petersburg Summit in 2013 a first accountability report on development commitments is presented.^[30] This report clearly states that the G20 “...brings together emerging and established donors”, a wording that usually the emerging economies are reluctant to accept, inventing various alternative terms for donor, such as partner, provider, etc.... However, they seem to have accepted the term in the context of G20.

Acharya (2013:199) refers to the new division between the “power South” and the “poor South” to describe developing countries that belong to the G20 and those that do not, stating that “a novelty of the G20 is that its membership is supposed to bridge the traditional North-South divide. Yet is the G20 representative of the developing world or reflexive of a new fault-line between the “poor South” and the “power South?””

DIFFERENTIATION IN EUROPEAN UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION

The European Union in its external relations has discreetly started to act on the structural differences that have become manifest among developing countries, namely in the context of the definition of its external financing instruments in the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework^[31]. In fact, in recent legislation adopted in 2014^[32], the EU decided to graduate all developing G20 countries from its bilateral development cooperation programs, reserving these bilateral aid envelopes for poorer countries and therefore concentrate its development assistance on the countries mostly in need. Although many of the

[31] European Commission Communication – COM (2011) 865 final – Global Europe: A New Approach to financing EU external action.

[32] Regulations (EU) 233, 234 and 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing respectively a financing Instrument for Development Cooperation, a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries and Common Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing external action, published in EU Official Journal, L77 of 15 March 2014.

poorest populations live in G20 countries, the rationale is that the EU aid should concentrate its aid where it can make a difference, and it can hardly do so in G20 countries since these have access to other more significant financial resources (domestic and external), and no longer rely heavily on ODA for their development or poverty reduction.

At the same time, the EU created a new financial envelope, the Partnership Instrument, with the aim of promoting EU interests abroad, namely through the establishment of partnerships with the EU's Strategic Partners (that is, the major world economies – Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India, China, South Korea, Russia and Japan), including therefore the main emerging powers. This instrument is not classified as ODA but allows the EU to partner with these countries as equals and not on a donor-recipient basis.

It is also significant that the eligibility rules for EU financing and the rules of origin applicable to the public contracting of these funds also clearly differentiate between developing countries that belong to the G20 and other developing countries. The former only have access to EU development contracting if they, as other developed countries, guarantee reciprocity to EU firms in their own contracting.

These important changes in legislation clearly indicate that the EU no longer considers the emerging powers as “ordinary” developing countries but as a new reality that requires a different policy response. They are not completely developed countries either, since they continue to access EU development cooperation regional and thematic programs. What this illustrates is that for the EU there are now also three categories of countries – the developed, the developing and the developing G20 members.

However, it is important to note that the changes incorporated by the EU in its external financing rules are unilateral and as such, they are decisions that are much easier to translate into practice than when the emerging countries themselves are involved in the process.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (GPEDC)

Although traditional donors had been trying for years to bring the emerging donors to the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, it was only in 2011, during the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness that took place in Busan (Korea), that emerging donors were involved in the negotiation of the Forum's Final Declaration. It was a tough negotiation but the Busan Declaration concluded by including, at the demand of emerging donors, a paragraph that refers to the nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to "south-south" cooperation and that are different from the ones that apply to "north-south" cooperation, recognizing the differences between these two types of cooperation. It also states that the Declaration's principles, commitments and actions shall be the reference for "south-south" partners only on a voluntary basis, that is, they are not binding for them (according to paragraph 2 of this document).^[33] This differentiation that was established in Busan reinforces north-south Rhetoric, and even stresses the differences that supposedly existed, while also breaking up with the traditional north-south paradigm in

^[33] [www.oecd.org/development/ef-
fectiveness/49650173.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/development/ef-
fectiveness/49650173.pdf) consulted
14.12.14.

practice, as it recognizes the existence of two “souths” in the development effectiveness agenda (Eyben and Savage (2012)).^[34]

As expected, this Declaration had an immediate effect on the negotiating process that led to the first Ministerial Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation that took place in April 2014 in Mexico City. In fact, this is evident right from the setting-up of the institutional arrangements of the three co-chairs that were appointed to carry forward the work of the Global Partnership. Two chairs reflect the traditional divide between developed and developing countries or between donors and recipients, but a new category of countries takes institutional expression in these negotiations when

the third chair gives voice to the developing countries that are also donors or providers of development cooperation^[35].

So it seems that in the context of the GPEDC there are now also three categories of countries: the developed, the developing and “the ones in between”, that is the developed “South”.

AND IN THE UNITED NATIONS CONTEXT?

The new reality of global emerging powers is however proving to be very difficult to translate in multi-lateral negotiations at the UN level, and even at the WTO, since this involves a change in these countries’ position regarding their traditional role in these frameworks. As explained by Weinlich (2014), they

[34] These authors refer to the changes, especially visible in Busan, that are occurring in the geography of development due to the appearance of the emerging powers and the crisis in the submerging ones (as they portrait the traditional donors). Most interestingly, the article stresses how Busan revealed the importance of participants geographic identities, with all participants trying earnestly to avoid being associated with the “North” and many trying to position themselves as bridges between the North and the South, as for example Korea and Mexico, but also, somewhat surprisingly, the World Bank and the OECD. They quote a NGO representative in the Conference saying “... the fractures along the North-South lines are deepening, leaving each country trapped by its geographical label.” (pp 465).

[35] Kharas (2014:855) rightly notes that the governing structure of GPEDC “...better reflects today’s major players” in international development.

seem very reluctant to do so in the UN context, clearly preferring to maintain what she calls their “ordinary” developing country status: “They underline their commonalities with poorer developing countries and continue to be members of G77. Any similarities to western donors or the traditional aid paradigm are denied. By setting themselves so starkly apart, the four countries (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) do not fully acknowledge that they are also involved in the governance and oversight of the rest of the UN’s development operations on a formally equitable basis. Instead of reaching out to influence and shape the larger part of the UN’s \$23.9 billion operational activities, they seem to confine themselves to a SSC (South-South Cooperation) niche which, however, they want to expand. At the same time their own contributions to financing such an expansion are marginal; the four emerging powers want industrialized countries to pay – while opposing any form of Western infringement as well as any attempt to discuss multilateral norms and rules beyond the to date rather vague SSC principles.” (op.cit.pp1837).

The reasons for maintaining their traditional positions are tentatively explained by Weinlich with two lines of argumentation, the rationalist and the constructivist explanations (op.cit.pp1839). According to the rationalist argument, the position of the emerging powers is probably an expression of the cost-efficiency analysis made by them and which leads them to consider that they would loose more than they would gain financially if they changed their position. From a constructivist view point, the explanation of the crystalized position of the emerging powers takes into account historical and cultural factors and not any rational accounting calculations. According to this interpretation, these countries’ foreign policies, and perhaps even their national identities, could be embedded with notions of pertaining to the

developing countries, to being ex-colonies, to belonging to the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. In other words, “It is plausible that the experiences of being disadvantaged are engrained in the political cultures of the foreign offices of the four selected countries, which makes it difficult to find an alternative role at the UN outside the North-South dichotomy.” (op.cit. pp1840).

In addition to these interpretations that might also reinforce each other, the developed countries also seem to be partially responsible for this status quo^[36].

Even though the developed countries have recently started to declare that they want to break away from the North-South divide, and want the emerging countries to shoulder greater responsibilities, the truth is that this has been very timidly voiced. Indeed, the developed countries have not insisted that the rules of the game cannot remain the same. And this insistence should be a result not only of the striking power-shifts that have taken place in the world economy and therefore of equity, but also of the absolute necessity for global survival, from a normative point of view. They should not

continue to hide behind the notion of “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities” (CBDR), a principle adopted in 1992 in the Rio UN Conference on Sustainable Development, when the emerging countries had not yet emerged, as referred by Hurrell and Sengupta (2012).

Only an evolution of negotiating positions will allow for a satisfactory conclusion of important multilateral negotiations such as on Climate Change or Sustainable Development. The key to these negotiations, such as those on the emerging powers

[36] See Hurrell and Sengupta (2012) regarding global climate negotiations and the way that emerging powers and North-South relations have played out in this context. The principle of CBDR – Common but Differentiated Responsibility – agreed to in Rio in 1992, has quite strikingly not been challenged to date.

[37] The need for emerging powers to change in position is voiced by Dhar (2012), Mattoo and Subramanian (2013) and Browne and Weiss (2014). The latter recall CIB and other emerging economies already account for 40% of world population and 50% of its GDP (pp 1897), so any global arrangement to be meaningful has to take this on board.

willingness to take on responsibilities and commitments as their active engagement is crucial for a sustainable planet^[37]. In fact, even if the developed countries were willing to take on the entirety of the mitigation effort that is indispensable in order to guarantee the sustainability of the planet, that would still not be enough, in face of the enormous impact that emerging economies have on natural resources at present and in the foreseeable future^[38].

As stated by Pauwelyn (2013:29), the division of the world “in two groups of countries – developed and developing – remains deeply engrained” but the persistence of this dichotomy is increasingly problematic for global governance. In his article Pauwelyn considers that the deadlock in both trade and climate multilateral negotiations (WTO and UN respectively) is due to the *de factum* end of the North-South divide. Currently, the differences that exist between developing countries are far too many for this collective to be treated as a sole grouping. The emerging countries position, “closing ranks with other developing countries to continue to form a single group” (ibid.: 35) be it in the context of the “Doha Round” which started in 2001, or in the context of the climate change regime in Copenhagen in 2009, led these negotiations to a stall. Former United States Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, is quoted as referring to this as “elephants hiding behind mice.” Developed countries on the other side demand deeper commitments from emerging countries and use their refusal as an excuse not to make further commitments of their own. But the main losers of this stalemate are certainly the poorest developing countries that are generally more vulnerable to climate change and which would benefit the most from a completed WTO Round.

[38]

In other fields of multilateral negotiations, such as trade, this differentiation of responsibilities among developing countries is also crucial.

For these and other multilateral negotiations, such as the Post-2015 Agenda, to evolve, more differentiation among developing countries seems paramount. Pauwelyn (ibid.:29) considers that a considerable change is currently taking place, “away from differential treatment for developing countries as a group, and towards individualized differentiation between countries, based on objective, issue-specific criteria.” This clearly seems to be the case with the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) as a universally applicable agenda for all countries, global in nature, “while taking into account different

national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities,”^[39] presenting therefore an increasing tailor-made approach.

^[39] The Future We Want (UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, 11.09.2012. Annex – paragraphs 15 and 191.

Conclusions

As a result of the geo-economic power-shifts that have been taking place at the global level over the last couple of decades, and with the creation of the G20 as the main forum for discussion of international economic policy, a new paradigm seems to be in the making in international relations. This change, which is only slowly appearing in different contexts, has clearly started to be felt in the field of development cooperation, forging new concepts and new designations. As referred by Mawdsley (2012:194), various authors consider that the appearance of the G20 signals the dismantling of the traditional North-South divide, a process that we have tried to illustrate with three concrete examples (G20, EU and GPEDC) that seem to be significant but that nevertheless is only the tip of the ice-berg, as this appears to be the beginning of a long and complex process.

The structural change that is occurring in some of the developing countries, namely those that belong to G20 has not yet had many visible effects in the “north-south” divide, especially because most of these countries want to belong to the group of the major economies (where they clearly belong) while they also desire to continue positioning themselves as “ordinary” developing countries, arguably playing a simultaneously comfortable and profitable double role and maintaining the North-South rhetoric very much alive. This has been illustrated in chapter 4.4 in respect to the difficulty in advancing multilateral negotiations in the wider WTO and UN contexts.

The appearance of the emerging countries also signifies that capitalism has spread further out, from the center or the west to the periphery

or the rest, and is now a transnational, de-territorialized capitalist order. This systemic change has to do with flows, networks, connections in which inequality and poverty is certainly present but no longer relates to North-South geographies or to the Third World, as explained by Hurrell and Sengupta (2012). Even Rist (2014:240) refers specifically to the fact that with the new millennium “...the old hierarchy that set “developed” above “underdeveloped” countries was widely called into question^[40], to such an extent that the customary terminology itself came to be seen as inadequate.” In the same vein he argues that “the lines that once divided the world into three relatively homogeneous groups (“rich”, “socialist” and “Third World”) no longer make any sense; we have to get used to the new “leopard skin geography”, in which rich (or very rich) rub shoulders with the poor (and the very poor), both internationally and within individual nations.” (op.cit:241).

But the need for new designates is also described very eloquently by Sidaway (2012: 56) who states in his conclusions that “the rise and circulation of BRICS also rests on two decades of emerging market discourse and are embodiments of and agents in the decomposition of the Third World as denoting a meaningful category. Third World is now likely to be invoked for its historical resonance, rather like the Soviet Bloc.” Sidaway closes by asking “What then of the geography of development? Where and what remains of the geography of development?” and then provides his answer: “in addressing such questions, nuanced maps will be needed.”

^[40] He refers mainly to the emerging economies (the BRICS as well as other countries such as Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey) but also to the phenomena that is taking place in the once developed countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.

Although the theme of this essay is still relatively new and difficult to discuss, as it seems to

be understood by many people and institutions with a development cooperation background as verging on the politically incorrect, it nevertheless appears as one of the most interesting subjects to study in this field, with ramifications in the development cooperation scene and subsequently in all major economic multilateral negotiations.

It is also possible that the continued development of major emerging economies, namely China, India and Brazil, and also of other countries such as Chile, Turkey and Mexico, will gradually lead these countries to a developed country status, as has already been the case of other countries such as Portugal, Spain and even South Korea, and that therefore the paradigm will not really change, returning instead to just two categories of countries – developed and developing. However, what will certainly change significantly is the scale of things, with the majority of the world population belonging to the developed part of the world.

Nevertheless, at the outset of the 21st century it seems possible to speak of three categories of countries in development cooperation, and this breakdown appears to better describe the current reality, thus contributing to a better understanding of the process and consequently to the formulation of better public policies .

If this categorization proves to be too difficult to reach agreements for the reasons described in 4.4, we could alternatively move towards the eradication of categories and the creation of a continuum of “developing countries”, made up of all the countries in the world, each responsible for its fair share in ensuring global governance, a method that, as explained by Pauwelyn (2013:41), is already used in the UN to establish the countries’ contributions to peacekeeping activities and to the general budget of the organization.

On the other hand, if for some reason the emerging countries stop or reverse their recent growth trajectory and their convergence with the developed countries is halted, the evolution into three categories of countries that we have tried to describe will not consolidate and we will fall back on the traditional developed and developing countries divide. As Chin and Heine (2014: 866) point out, it may still be too soon to know exactly to what extent the rise of the emerging countries “signifies a change in the norms and goals of international development or a fundamental evolution in international relations”, but they conclude that

“the ascent of the BRICS will continue to be a game-changer in development cooperation for the foreseeable future...”.

ANNEXES

Annex 1

AFRICA'S EXPORTS IN VALUE TO DIFFERENT MARKETS 2000-2013

(in thousands of dollars)

Economy		Africa excluding South Africa		
Year		2000	2010	2013
Product	Partner			
Total all products	World	117 259 097,9	431 573 163,2	50 507 029,1
	EU28 (European Union)	58 897 113,55	152 897 379,7	196 354 973
	United States	21 651 270,87	76 750 393,24	43 770 357,99
	China	3 992 465,393	51 041 334,4	66 358 267,48
	India	3 288 880,306	23 162 724,17	30 060 756,65
	Brazil	2 557 528,64	10 843 710,1	16 856 899,18
	South Africa	1 593 110,38	10 862 651,22	14 846 768,42

Source: UNCTAD Database

Annex 2

SHARE OF AFRICA'S EXPORTS TO DIFFERENT MARKETS 2000-2013

(in %)

Economy		Africa excluding South Africa		
Year		2000	2010	2013
Product	Partner			
Total all products	World	100	100	100
	EU28 (European Union)	50,23	35,43	38,88
	United States	18,46	17,78	8,67
	China	3,40	11,83	13,14
	India	2,80	5,37	5,95
	Brazil	2,20	2,51	3,34
	South Africa	1,36	2,52	2,94

Source: UNCTAD Database

Annex 3

AFRICA'S IMPORTS IN VALUE FROM DIFFERENT MARKETS 2000-2013

(in thousands of dollars)

Economy		Africa excluding South Africa		
Year		2000	2010	2013
Product	Partner			
Total all products	World	99 074 685,59	383 288 036,5	507 872 503,9
	EU28 (European Union)	44 716 168,4	130 770 066,1	164 461 544,7
	South Africa	8 531 773,597	24 156 329,76	27 867 538,99
	United States	7 513 583,367	24 266 630,91	29 995 432,03
	China	3 321 450,381	44 144 736,4	71 423 748,85
	India	1 797 975,214	14 584 068,5	25 859 789,5
	Brazil	1 121 451,553	7 887 642,359	9 845 301,704

Source: UNCTAD Database

Annex 4

SHARE OF AFRICA'S IMPORTS FROM DIFFERENT MARKETS 2000-2013

(in %)

Economy		Africa excluding South Africa		
Year		2000	2010	2013
Product	Partner			
Total all products	World	100	100	100
	EU28 (European Union)	45,13	34,12	32,38
	South Africa	8,61	6,3	5,49
	United States	7,58	6,30	5,90
	China	3,35	11,51	14,06
	India	1,81	3,8	5,09
	Brazil	1,13	2,06	1,94

Source: UNCTAD Database

Annex 5

FDI FLOWS AND STOCK FROM CHINA, INDIA, BRAZIL, USA AND PORTUGAL- 2001-2012

(in millions of USD)

			2001	2002	2003
China	<i>FD outward flow</i>	World	46 878	52 743	53 505
		of which: Africa	75
	<i>FD outward stock</i>	World	33 222
		of which: Africa	491
India	<i>FD outward flow</i>	World
		of which: Africa
	<i>FD outward stock</i>	World
		of which: Africa
Brasil	<i>FD outward flow</i>	World
		of which: Africa
	<i>FD outward stock</i>	World	49 689	54 423	54 892
		of which: Africa	433	164	109
USA	<i>FD outward flow</i>	World	124 873	134 946	129 352
		of which: Africa	2 439	-578	2 697
	<i>FD outward stock</i>	World	1 460 352	1 616 548	1 769 613
		of which: Africa	15 574	16 040	19 835
Portugal	<i>FD outward</i>	World	6 262	-149	6 583
		of which: Africa	140	-608	-3
	<i>FD outward</i>	World	22 265	21 325	34 443
		of which: Africa	1 720	1 097	1 284

Source: Bilateral Investment Statistics UNCTAD - 2014

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
60 630	72 406	72 715	83 521	108 312	94 065	114 734	123 985	111 716
317	392	520	1 574	5 491	1 439	2 112	3 173	2 517
44 777	57 206	75 026	117 911	183 971	245 755	317 211	424 781	531 941
900	1 595	2 557	4 462	7 804	9 332	13 042	16 244	21 730
..	18 337	11 405	10 973
..	5 116	2 661	1 829
..	71 315	73 774	79 857
..	11 886	13 103	13 261
..	..	24 005	11 645	13 270	4 079	11 588	- 1 015	-2 821
..	..	2	1	10	-5	..	-5	102
69 196	79 259	114 175	140 036	155 942	164 523	188 637	202 586	266 252
143	144	26	73	107	124	67	125	1 175
294 905	15 369	224 220	393 518	308 296	266 955	304 399	396 656	366 940
1 612	2 564	5 157	4 490	3 837	9 447	9 281	5 127	3 706
2 160 844	2 241 656	2 477 268	2 993 980	3 232 493	3 565 020	3 741 910	4 084 659	4 453 307
20 356	22 756	28 155	32 607	36 746	43 924	54 799	57 213	61 366
7 453	2 111	7 139	5 493	2 741	816	-7 493	14 905	579
110	249	309	-1 070	-883	- 1 128	149	302	272
43 941	41 965	53 984	67 708	63 006	68 471	66 732	72 230	76 048
1 356	1 469	1 810	2 411	5 162	3 868	4 868	5 744	6 846

Annex 6

ESTIMATED ODA – LIKE FLOWS FROM CHINA, INDIA AND BRAZIL 2007-2013

(Current USD Millions)

Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Source
Estimates on ODA-like flows as published in national publications								
Brazil	291,9	336,8	362,2	482,1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Until 2010: pea and ABC, Brazil.
China	1 466,2	1 807,0	1 946,5	2 011,2	2 470,0	2.845,7d	3.146,9f	Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance, China.
India ¹	392,6	609,5	488,0	639,1	730,7	652p		Annual Reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India

Source: OECD Development Cooperation Reports

d=disbursed; p=provisional; f:forward spending information; n.a.=not available

1) Figures for India are based on fiscal years. 2012 data correspond to fiscal year 2012/2013.

i) These data are Secretariat estimates of concessional flows for development from countries that do not report in DAC statistical systems. Contrary to the figures of reporting countries, these estimates are on a gross basis because information on repayments is not available.

ii) Estimates are based on publically available information. Therefore, these estimates are not necessarily complete or comparable.

iii) Data includes only development-related contributions. This means local resources, financing from a country through multilateral organisations earmarked to programmes within that same country, are excluded. Moreover, as for reporting countries, coefficients are applied to core contributions to multilateral organisations that do not exclusively work in countries eligible for receiving ODA.

These coefficients reflect the developmental part of the multilateral organisations' activities.

iv) For China, India and Indonesia, the total is the result of summing up bilateral development co-operation and information on development co-operation channelled through multilateral organisations which is mainly based on data from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), www.aidflows.org and websites of other multilateral organisations.

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POSFÁCIO





Evocção de um Sorriso

José Manuel Briosa e Gala

Um belo dia, uma jovem, técnica superior da Direcção-Geral das Comunidades Europeias, bateu à minha porta. Após a apresentação e um relato da experiência profissional, concluiu da forma mais natural: “Gostava de trabalhar consigo”. A cena é literal e surpreende-me ainda fora do Ministério. Foi assim que conheci a Inês e se iria dar início, na Secretaria de Estado da Cooperação, à primeira das muitas jornadas de percurso que a vida teria para nos reservar.

A Inês havia começado a trabalhar no Secretariado para a Integração Europeia, integrando a equipa responsável pelos trabalhos preparatórios e de negociação que conduziram à adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias. Um dos capítulos de que se ocupava era o das Relações Externas da Comunidade, e, entre estas, as que enquadravam institucionalmente o diálogo com os países de África, Caraíbas e Pacífico, consagrado na Convenção de Lomé. Já durante a primeira Presidência Portuguesa do Conselho Europeu (Janeiro-Junho de 1992) havia sido nomeada responsável de vários grupos de trabalho, entre os quais o da Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento e o da América Latina (onde assumiu o papel de porta-voz nacional), e ainda o de Ambiente e Desenvolvimento (com vista à preparação da Cimeira da Terra, no Rio de Janeiro).

A experiência que cedo acumulou e a reflexão criativa que lhe era natural vieram a revelar-se de um valor inestimável na actividade que desenvolveu nesses três anos de funções como adjunta no Gabinete do Secretário de Estado (de Novembro de 1992 a finais de Outubro de 1995). De facto, se a participação de Portugal no sistema de cooperação internacional fora pouco relevante até à primeira metade dos anos 80, a adesão à Comunidade Económica Europeia, por si só, induziu a uma expansão exponencial da presença nacional, implicando a exposição a novas áreas geográficas e temáticas e também a assunção dos direitos e obrigações decorrentes de novos compromissos. Desta nova exigência é paradigmática a re-adesão, em 1991, ao Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD)

da OCDE, instância que reúne os principais países doadores. No mesmo sentido, a circunstância de, no ano seguinte, Portugal deixar a qualificação de país em desenvolvimento junto do Programa da Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD), assumindo doravante um estatuto de maioria internacional, em termos de capacidade de vinculação efectiva. Reflexos deste reconhecimento: a eleição para o Conselho Executivo do PNUD durante o triénio 1994-1996, importante e público reforço de um perfil solidário, logo prosseguido com a integração no Comité Económico e Social das Nações Unidas (ECOSOC), factos estes participando de um momentum em que as instituições discutem a “Nova Agenda para o Desenvolvimento”.

Após a queda do Muro de Berlim, é esta a década das grandes Conferências das Nações Unidas sobre os temas globais que viriam a mobilizar a esperança dos povos e a vontade política de governantes; no fundo, o desejo de todos aqueles que acreditavam ser possível construir, em conjunto, um mundo melhor. É pois com entusiasmo que a Inês abraça os novos desafios: depois do Rio (Junho de 1992), participa, agora já na Secretaria de Estado da Cooperação, nos debates preparatórios e na reflexão conjunta onde são apresentadas as propostas em discussão no limiar do século XXI. Foi o caso da Cimeira Mundial sobre o Desenvolvimento Social, que teve lugar em Copenhaga entre 6 e 12 de Março de 1995, dedicada a três temas: o combate à pobreza, a criação de emprego e a integração social; foi igualmente a Conferência Internacional sobre População e Desenvolvimento (Cairo, 5 a 13 de Setembro) e por fim a IV Conferência Mundial sobre as Mulheres (Pequim, 4 a 15 de Setembro de 1995, reunindo 189 delegações internacionais, mais de 2 000 organizações não governamentais e 30 000 participantes da sociedade civil), a qual prossegue e aprofunda, relativamente à situação específica da mulher, o debate iniciado na Conferência Mundial sobre Direitos Humanos (Viena, Junho de 1993).

Neste período, a reestruturação que simultaneamente operávamos nos serviços da cooperação – em particular a fusão da Direcção-Geral da Cooperação com o Instituto para a Cooperação Económica no nível Instituto da Cooperação Portuguesa, bem como a passagem do recém-criado Instituto Camões para a tutela do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, ou ainda a criação da nova Comissão Interministerial para a Cooperação – visava dotar a actividade do Estado, neste domínio, de uma concentração de meios num ponto focal. Isto mesmo será

reconhecido no primeiro exame a que o País é submetido pelos parceiros do CAD, em Dezembro de 1993: o objectivo era “melhorar a transferência, a coordenação e a eficácia do programa de ajuda portuguesa”. A partir daqui a Inês passaria a ser convidada frequente das reuniões de Alto Nível daquela Organização, integrando inclusivamente as equipas de pares que procediam às avaliações da cooperação de outros Estados membros (como foi o caso do exame à Grécia, em 2012).

Ao nível do relacionamento pessoal e da interacção com os serviços, a simplificação e concentração das estruturas propiciou-lhe múltiplas ocasiões para promover debates alargados, integrar grupos de trabalho, fazer pontes entre os sectores e influenciar a definição das políticas. Foi a ocasião ideal para conhecer, e tornar-se conhecida, não apenas da maioria dos decisores e agentes já não só da máquina do Estado, mas, a partir desta, alargar o relacionamento à sociedade civil, designadamente estreitando laços com as organizações não-governamentais.

De entre os múltiplos aspectos temáticos abrangidos pelo “Multilateral” em que se especializou, destacaria a relação entre a União Europeia e África. Houve a circunstância de termos participado na Reunião Ministerial ACP/CEE, em Maio de 1994, na Suazilândia, onde se dá o início formal das negociações de revisão da Convenção de Lomé, e é já durante a Presidência Portuguesa da UE, em 2000, que se concluem as negociações daquele Tratado mediante a assinatura do Acordo de Cotonou. Foi uma enorme vitória da nossa Presidência e o coroar do trabalho da delegação nacional do Grupo ad-hoc pós-Lomé do Conselho que a Inês orientou, já que, a partir de 1996, havia sido nomeada sucessivamente chefe de divisão e directora de serviços para a área multilateral do órgão central da cooperação, ICP. A este virá a suceder o Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD) e no qual desempenhará igualmente funções de directora de serviços, vogal, vice-Presidente e Presidente interina.

Ao longo dos anos em que estive no IPAD foi responsável pelas áreas multilateral, europeia e relações com a sociedade civil, nomeadamente com as ONGD, tendo chefiado a delegação nacional em diversas negociações bilaterais e multilaterais, em representação daquela instituição e do Governo. Em 2007, durante a nova Presidência Portuguesa do Conselho da UE, voltou a assumir a coordenação técnica do domínio da cooperação para o Desenvolvimento. Coordenou igualmente a mesma área durante a Presidência Portuguesa da CPLP, assim como o fez ao nível do “African Partnership Forum”, plataforma vocacionada

ao aconselhamento político ao mais alto nível, aí liderando a posição dos países não-G20, face aos países G20 e aos países africanos. Dez anos volvidos sobre o Acordo de Cotonou e vêmo-la no Conselho de Ministros ACP-UE a assinar em nome do seu País a revisão (2ª) do mesmo Acordo, acto do qual as fotografias existentes captam bem a alegria e o orgulho.

Muito mais poderia destacar-se do seu curriculum profissional, mencionando apenas a disponibilidade constante para, informal e regularmente, continuar a acompanhar os colegas que lhe pediam conselho, o que acontecia igualmente com membros de “think tanks” europeus que vinham a Lisboa ouvir a sua opinião. Este reconhecimento justifica, por exemplo, o convite do Governo norte-americano para participar no “International Visitor Leadership Program”, em 2009.

Pode dizer-se, de forma objectiva, que ao longo da carreira inspirou e acompanhou as mais importantes formulações do interesse nacional na área de intervenção que lhe estava confiada, desde as magnas Conferências Internacionais sobre o Desenvolvimento, das Nações Unidas e outras, até à preparação semestral do Conselho de Ministros do Desenvolvimento em Bruxelas, o qual na maioria das vezes seguia presencialmente.

Há uma coerência de percurso assinalável desde o início do seu trabalho: realização pessoal na defesa da causa pública, crença nos valores de construção de uma identidade europeia, empenhamento a favor dos mais desprotegidos, tendo como motivação a luta contra a partilha injusta, as desigualdades herdadas e a marginalização, quer das pessoas, quer dos chamados Estados Frágeis.

Como atitude sua, a de acreditar que é possível mudar o destino, força interior que revertia em determinação e capacidade de agregar vontades. Era a alegria, a paixão e autenticidade da dádiva aos outros que venciam a desesperança e se tornava mobilizadora. Ficou como a sua marca, que tantos amigos verdadeiros cativou entre colegas e junto de uma geração de técnicos que ajudou a formar. Do “Livro em Memória de Inês Rosa, 1961-2015 – Camões I.P.”, feito de depoimentos registados em sua honra: “sempre preocupada com todos, uma líder, não uma chefe!”, “a sua equipa não tinha “funcionários”, tinha pessoas e amigos”, “um sorriso que jamais se esquece!”. Como estes, muitos outros testemunhos que prestam o reconhecimento e retratam a concepção da

amizade nietzscheana na atitude daquele que partilha o sofrimento e, mais ainda, a alegria: o resultado de uma simpatia que significa literalmente “sentimento partilhado”. No fundo, uma arte de “ligar” a vida e a construção de uma ética da amizade. Sintomaticamente, o mesmo Nietzsche defende que não é professor, nem funcionário quem não traga esse suplemento de benevolência à sua prática: “é a emanção contínua de humanidade, como as ondas da sua luz, nas quais tudo se desenvolve”.

E nos momentos mais sombrios, mesmo da vida pessoal, em que parece que tudo se desmorona e a tristeza nos vence, recordo ainda a Inês: “Já ouviste bem a letra da canção de Charles Chaplin, SMILE ?”. Era um anti-depressivo de bolso a que recorria, simples e eficaz...pelo menos fazia sorrir.

Se a descrição muito sumária desta entrega profissional já justificaria o louvor de uma vida, ficaríamos ainda assim muito aquém do mero aproximar da singularidade de uma personalidade tão luminosa quanto a que agora nos falta.

Procurando cingir-me a sinais fácticos da sua biografia, um dos traços fundos do seu estar, do qual a vida pública aproveitou, era na verdade o de ser solidária. Filha de diplomatas – o pai por profissão, a mãe por vocação, o primeiro exercendo formalmente, esta de modo natural e consubstancial – a Inês teve o destino familiar típico da situação, o de seguir o agregado por essas partidas do mundo, compartilhando as sortes e não poucas vezes as vicissitudes políticas de época conturbada. Assim, mal acaba de nascer em Dakar, capital do Senegal, no dia 19 de Abril de 1961, já seu pai, dois meses passados, se vê obrigado a evacuar a família, por razões oficiais de solidariedade política do país anfitrião com a luta armada em Angola. A propósito de incidências da profissão na vida familiar, uma outra ocasião crítica ocorrerá, agora em Madrid – onde vive entre Novembro de 1974 e Junho de 1977 – com a tensão e as ameaças havidas em represália à invasão, em 1975, da Embaixada de Espanha em Lisboa, tendo ela e sua irmã mais nova sido alojadas em casa de amigos (por sinal também diplomatas, e de nacionalidade espanhola) durante várias semanas. A este destino seguir-se-á o Brasil, onde conclui a licenciatura em Economia, de Setembro de 1977 a Dezembro de 1981, após o que recusa uma bolsa para doutoramento nos EUA para finalmente regressar a Portugal, onde vimos que se inicia a história anterior. Diga-se também que já estivera “colocada” em Washington após a saída do Senegal, tendo ali permanecido entre 1961 e 1966. Falta referir uma

passagem por Roma (princípios de 1982) e, sobretudo, os sete anos (1967-1974) vividos na África do Sul, uma experiência marcante em muitos aspectos, como, por exemplo, o da diferença de tratamento racial, a divisão entre pessoas por categorias. Ao nível doméstico, sempre se queixaria (documentado já nos seus “Journals” escolares) do facto de ver-se obrigada a mudar de casa a cada seis meses, pois era o que sucedia à época com a alternância da capital política entre Pretória e a Cidade do Cabo, movimento de deslocalização de soberania que a comunidade diplomática tinha de acompanhar.

Esta vida itinerante, de errância entre pessoas e lugares, de laços desfeitos e amizades interrompidas, viria a reforçar em si uma sentida necessidade de enraizamento. Sofria a separação, a distância que se interpõe em cada relação. E intuiu cedo, de tantas viagens, que um dia teria de ir-se, numa partida sem regresso nem despedida. Este último transe era aceite com muita serenidade; a dor do exílio de quem se gosta, ou a quem não consegue ajudar, essa era mais difícil de suportar a um coração compassivo.

Diz a filósofa Simone Weil que “o enraizamento talvez seja a necessidade mais importante e ignorada da alma humana. É uma das mais difíceis de definir”. E a necessidade de enraizamento, chamemos-lhe primária, e mesmo geográfica, muito condicionada à margem do rio onde acidentalmente se nasce, como referia Pascal, no caso das circunstâncias da sua juventude levou-a a sublimar também em sentimento uma ideia que foi construindo do seu País, através do exemplo de seus pais, do que ia conhecendo da História e da literatura, do gosto das vindas periódicas ao Alentejo dos seus avós, do aí desfrutar das desejadas férias com todos os irmãos.

A solidariedade era vivida como um sentimento de pertença: a uma família – as filhas, mais tarde -, a uma comunidade de afectos; era mais do que uma construção identitária, constituiu o elo vital da sua existência e âncora de estabilidade emocional. Mas nunca confundia o orgulho de se “saber” portuguesa com a defesa sectária de interesses oportunistas ou patrioteiros, que ofendessem um sentido de justiça global, a sua integridade moral ou a dignidade de outrem. Espírito livre, não seguia de modo acrítico qualquer visão partidária e, sem contradição, via-se a si mesma também como profundamente europeia, sendo natural que tenha abraçado convictamente o projecto de construção política comum dos povos europeus. Mas mesmo este alargamento de esfera, digamos

espaço civilizacional, não toca o determinante, o nível profundamente ontológico que só a imersão na universalidade confere, a aspiração a uma totalidade que transcende o interesse individual e faz emergir a singularidade mais autêntica. É o lugar do apelo, da correspondência ao olhar do Outro. O imperativo de não cruzar os braços perante o sofrimento do próximo (mesmo do distante), de recusar a indiferença e de reivindicar o respeito da igual e absoluta dignidade de cada um.

Dotada de um temperamento apaixonado, não havia opções sem sentimento. Sempre muito persistente nos seus objectivos, transformou igualmente o trabalho na oportunidade do compromisso com esse Outro, na missão de lhe aliviar esse sofrimento e a miséria, no que de si, de nós, pudesse depender.

Os colegas que com ela privaram sabem bem como constituía sua prioridade constante, na adopção das políticas do Desenvolvimento, a luta contra a pobreza, e o quanto se batia para consagrar esta opção na estratégia comunitária. No âmbito da discussão daquelas políticas, não poucas vezes teve a coragem de, a partir de uma posição isolada, pela força dos seus argumentos ser capaz de convencer e de gerar consensos, reflectidos na adopção dos textos e dos próprios instrumentos normativos. Os mais desfavorecidos, e África em particular, formavam na verdade a linha da frente das suas preocupações. Esse auxílio era um combate, não tinha uma natureza assistencialista, exceptuadas as situações de emergência e crises humanitárias, bem entendido; antes visava a sustentabilidade, era um apoio de meios à apropriação política pelos próprios, no respeito da sua autonomia política.

Ter voltado “à escola” foi uma decisão de que desfrutou imensamente. Estava encantada com a perspectiva seguinte do doutoramento, e muito reconhecida pelos incentivos que recebera de todos – professores em primeiro lugar – os que acompanhavam a sua prestação académica, feita com a discrição, elegância e excelência que eram seu timbre.

Enquanto o Universo se ocupava do seu trabalho habitual, íamos forjando os dois, também nesta opção resguardada, a maravilha de sermos companheiros; e assim, no ar dos nossos debates académicos animados, se cruzavam com frequência Amartya Sen e Immanuel Kant, entre muitos outros, que, afinal, viriam a confluir no objectivo e proposta da comunidade ética, fundada em princípios de justiça dotados de exigência universal.

Os trabalhos eram lidos e reciprocamente comentados, e não tenho dúvidas de que, além da dissertação agora vinda a público, vários outros seus ganhariam em ser do mesmo modo divulgados.

No caso presente, foi-me pedida a “ajuda” ingrata de lhe sugerir páginas para “corte”, de modo a que o trabalho inicial pudesse caber no limite regulamentar das dez mil palavras; tarefa custosa, pois nada do que foi eliminado era redundante, antes acrescentava fundamentação sólida à tese defendida. Mas o que agora se publica responde bem por si.

O tema da dissertação foi longa e precocemente meditado, à luz da reflexão da sua própria experiência profissional, onde aplicava uma capacidade quase visionária de vislumbrar tendências e antecipar desenvolvimentos (na parte de que dou testemunho, poderia ir tão longe quanto remontar à Conferência Consultiva Anual do SADC, de Janeiro de 1994, em Gaborone, dedicada ao tema “Relações Regionais e Cooperação pós-apartheid”, onde logo detectou certos posicionamentos que o tempo viria a confirmar).

Ser ainda capaz de reflectir e teorizar sobre o conhecimento adquirido, prova-o o livro agora publicado.

Como finalizar uma apresentação a que as circunstâncias conferem igualmente a natureza de uma despedida?

A uma aflição como a presente, talvez apenas um poeta possa acudir. Sophia: “Diz-se que para um segredo não nos devore é preciso dizê-lo em voz alta no sol de um terraço ou de um pátio. Essa é a missão do poeta: Trazer para a luz e para o exterior o medo”.

Seja, pois, esta a inspiração que responde à dúvida pungente sobre o oferecer ou não à luz os últimos escritos pessoais da Inês. Últimos em descoberta, que eles são tão jovens. Não se trata de expor um diário, na circunstância apresentam-se como textos avaliados pela professora, e a sua natureza confessional apenas revela a pureza de intenções da autora e a maturidade da reflexão sobre as suas próprias angústias.

Assim, nos dias a seguir à sua morte (28 de Julho), os cadernos escolares dos tempos em que frequentava, em Madrid, o Runnymede College (“Inês Rosa, Upper V-B”, ainda com autocolante do Snoopy), vêm ao meu encontro. Havia-os redescoberto ela dias antes apenas, já não nos seria concedido o tempo de os ler em cumplicidade,

conforme era de seu desejo. Nesta revelação, a Inês teria 13, no máximo 14 anos, e, no entanto, desde logo irrompe aqui adulta, inteira a pessoa que sempre seria. E é naturalmente pelo brotar daquela humanidade que se acede ao testemunho, entre a vontade de partilhar um tesouro e o pudor de com ela compartilhar.

Abro por fim o caderno, e oferece-se um texto intitulado “WASTE?”. De uma forma que nos faz sorrir, aí permite-se aquela muito jovem fazer já um balanço da sua vida (começa com: “My life really started when I was twelve”). Depois, precocemente antecipa o seu encontro com o inevitável momento final: “It’s very strange but there’s one thing I’m not scared of, and that is Death. The “incognito” of death doesn’t seem to worry me. It’s just one of those things that happens inevitably and comes when it feels like it”.

E, ao responder ao título interrogativo que dá o nome à composição, na busca de um significado à vida que se abre, encontra-se perante si mesma. E desvela-se perante nós:

“I acquired a quality I didn’t have before. I found I had something that inspired the people whom I spoke and this makes them open their hearts to me. This seems to make them my friends as I’m always ready to listen and advise. On the other hand this is a disadvantage as I get depressed with all these peoples lives and problems but here again I have two ways of relieving my mind, which are either by dancing hours on end or by crying my heart out”.

Recolhidas devagar... este eco das palavras surpreende e atordoa o dia inóspito, hoje que já nada a perturba. Da sua vida agora desfeita – mas nunca desperdiçada, Inês – fica ainda, nesta memória sem consolo, a recordação infinita de um sorriso único que se completa, como imagem de uma grandeza intocada. E a rebeldia de cumprir o poema de Paul Celan: “... pelo rastro das lágrimas... aprende a viver...”

“SMILE”.

The major changes in the field of development cooperation begun in the last decade as a result of the economic emergence of some countries. Attention is given to the increasing economic role of China, India and Brazil in Africa over the last ten/twelve years, a role that provides them with the opportunity to project their power in a different region, which in turn boosts their image more like developed countries.

The emergence of these countries has the potential to structurally transform the prevailing traditional dichotomy since the end of the Second World War, between developed and developing countries in the framework of development cooperation.



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